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Abstract 
When people judge how tall a person is it is rational to assume that they ignore all 
irrelevant information about the color of his/her hair and eyes, the fact that he/she wears 
glasses, or the profession of that person, and focus on the relevant dimension “height” only. 
This dissertation is based on a model of judgment, JUDGEMAP-1, that proposes 
certain mechanisms that underlie judgment. This model assumes that in order for judgment 
to happen people activate a number of exemplars from the same category in Working 
Memory and this active set is called the comparison set. The target stimulus is included in 
this comparison set and altogether they are mapped on the scale using the same 
mechanisms that underlie analogical mapping. Thus, key for the rating, which the target 
stimulus will obtain, is what the other members of the comparison set are (if smaller 
exemplars happened to be involved in the comparison, the target will most probably receive 
a higher rating as it will stand out in the comparison set). The basic mechanism responsible 
for retrieving exemplars in WM in JUDGEMAP-1 is spreading activation and thus any 
kind of shared features will make the retrieval of a particular exemplar more probable. This 
means that the color of the hair and eyes, the profession of the person may actually play a 
role, since the comparison set will consist of people with similar characteristics. This 
theoretical prediction was backed up by a particular simulation experiment with 
JUDGEMAP-1 and thus formed the main prediction to be tested within this dissertation. 
A series of experiments has been performed that test this prediction under various 
circumstances. Even though the first experiment confirmed the prediction, , the size of the 
effect was very small (although significant), so there were serious doubts whether this 
result can be replicated. Thus, the series of experiments replicates the initial experiment 
varying some parameters in the hope to enlarge the size of the effect. The experiments 
varied the dimensionality of the stimuli, the presentation manner and presentation time of 
the stimuli, and the type of stimuli – from simple lines to rabbits to abstract numbers. Even 
though we could not increase the size of the effect, the effect was replicated quite robustly 
in almost all experiments.  
 i
Acknowledgments 
I would like to express my special gratitude to my supervisor Boicho 
Kokinov who has guided patiently my work during the recent 2 years and has 
strongly influenced the way I look at cognition. I heartfelt acknowledge his 
intellectual inspiration and constant moral support along the way.  
I would also like to thank my husband and collaborator Georgi Petkov 
for providing years of general support and encouragement. He has always 
asked me the most difficult and painful questions that turned to be, usually, 
the most important ones in my work.  
Two professors inspired and influenced me in significant ways. Prof. 
Stefan Mateev pushed to the limit my naïve understanding on data analysis 
and interpretation. Alexander Petrov has provided insightful and constructive 
ideas on my research. In many ways, they paved the road for this dissertation 
and determined the way it looks like now.  
Thanks to Armina Janjan for her patient assistance on my writing skills 
and for providing essential software and even hardware support.  
This research has been influenced in various ways from other past and 
present members of AMBR research group and Cognitive Science 
Department, including Evgenia Hristova, Neda Zareva, Boika Bratanova, 
Velina Balkanska, Veselina Feldman, Krasimira Janeva. 
Finally and most of all, I would like to thank my family for their love 
and support over the years and especially to my lovely little daughter for her 
patience and understanding.  
 ii
 Table of Content 
 
 Abstract i 
 Acknowledgements ii 
   
   
 INTRODUCTION 1 
   
CHAPTER 1.   
Empirical Evidence for Contrast and Assimilation 
Effects 
3 
 1.1. Contrast effect 3 
 1.1.1.     Anchor placed outside stimulus series 3 
 1.1.2. Primed context 5 
 1.1.3. Contrast depending on a set of stimuli 9 
 1.1.4. Contrast due to the irrelevant information 14 
 1.1.5. Summary and discussion of the empirical data for contrast effect 
18 
 1.2. Empirical Evidences for Assimilation Effect 19 
 1.2.1. Anchor placed inside the stimulus series 19 
 1.2.2. Primed context  20 
 1.2.3. Sequential effects 24 
 1.2.4. Assimilation due to an averaging between simultaneously presented stimuli 
26 
 1.2.5.     Assimilation due to an irrelevant to the task dimension 29 
 1.2.6. Summary and discussion of empirical data that reveals assimilation effect 
31 
 1.3. Discussion of the empirical data and conclusion 32 
   
CHAPTER 2. Theories of Judgment 35 
 2.1. Psychophysical point of view 36 
 2.2. Social Cognition Theories 41 
 2.3. Theories of Judgment - Conclusion 50 
   
CHAPTER 3.   JUDGEMAP-1 53 
 3.1. DUAL Cognitive Architecture 54 
 3.2. JUDGEMAP-1 55 
 3.3. Predictions of the Model. 61 
 3.3.1. How the comparison set is formed.  61 
 3.3.2. Idea for research on JUDGEMAP-1’s predictions 62 
 3.3.3. Aims of the present research 68 
   
CHAPTER 4. Exploring Empirically the Maximal Possible Size of 71 
 iii
the Effect in Ideal Conditions 
 
4.1. Control 1 Experiment: Judgment of lines that differ in 
length range and frequency distribution  
71 
 4.1.1. Method (design, stimuli, procedure, participants) 72 
 4.1.2. Results and discussion 73 
 
4.2. Control 2 Experiment: Judgment of positively and 
negatively skewed lines 
75 
 4.2.1. Method (design, stimuli, procedure, participants) 75 
 4.2.2. Results and Discussion 76 
   
CHAPTER 5. 
Experiment 1: Judgment of lines that differ both in 
Range and in Frequency with respect to their color 
80 
 5.1. Method (design, stimuli, procedure, participants) 81 
 5.2. Results and Discussion 83 
   
CHAPTER 6. Experiment 2: Judgment under “perceptual limitations” 87 
 6.1. Method (design, stimuli, procedure, participants) 87 
 6.2. Results and Discussion 89 
   
CHAPTER 7. Two or More Correlated Irrelevant Dimensions 92 
 7.1. Experiment 3: Color and Sound 92 
 7.1.1 Method (design, stimuli, procedure, participants) 93 
 7.1.2. Results and Discussion 94 
 7.2. Experiment 4: Judgment of the size of the Rabbits  97 
 7.2.1.Method (design, stimuli, procedure, participants) 97 
 7.2.2. Results and discussion 99 
   
CHAPTER 8. Reduced Perceptual Support 104 
 8.1. Experiment 5: Judgment of age  104 
           8.1.1. Method (design, stimuli, procedure, participants) 105 
 8.1.2. Results and Discussion 106 
   
CHAPTER 9. Conclusion 110 
 9.1. Conclusion and future work 110 
 9.2.Contributions 114 
   
 REFERENCES 116 
 LIST OF RELATED PUBLICATIONS 120 
 iv
Introduction 
The present research focuses on the mechanisms behind contextually 
sensitive judgment. Many experimental results in the field of judgment 
demonstrate a particular shift in ratings depending on the context.  The two 
main contextual effects usually found in such studies are called contrast (a 
shift in judgment away from the context) and assimilation (a shift in judgment 
toward the context).  
Unfortunately, the existing empirical studies could not unambiguously 
determine the conditions under which contrast and assimilation appear. This 
uncertainty calls into question the contextual nature of judgment in general, 
that is, whether the two contextual effects are systematic or can be considered 
as a noise.  
The presented research tests a particular prediction of the JUDGEMAP-
1 (Judgment as Mapping) Model, namely that irrelevant information 
influences judgment. This prediction is based on the spreading activation 
mechanism underlying the retrieval of information in memory. In 
JUDGEMAP-1 spreading activation brings from Long Term Memory (LTM) 
into Working Memory (WM) information about stimuli that are similar to the 
target stimulus both in terms of relevant and irrelevant features. For example, 
if a person has to judge the height of a particular target person, his/her 
judgment will be affected by the extra knowledge about the target. If the target 
person is a teacher, the stimuli, which could be elicited in WM during 
judgment, could be predominantly teachers. Moreover, if the target person is 
blond, it is quite likely that the exemplars elicited in WM would also be 
predominantly of other blond people. This prediction was tested 
experimentally with simple stimuli, e.g. lines with different color and 
confirmed in an empirical study conducted by Kokinov, Hristova, and Petkov 
(2004). The series of experiments reported in this dissertation focus 
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extensively on the boundary conditions of this effect. It investigates the size of 
the effect and its systematization varying the dimensionality of the stimuli, the 
presentation conditions, and the abstractness of the stimuli.  
The thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 1 reviews 
empirical data and theories of contextual effects on judgment of both simple 
and complex stimuli. Chapter 2 presents the JUDGEMAP-1 Model, the 
cognitive architecture DUAL that JUDGEMAP-1 is based on and the 
mechanisms of judgment proposed by the model. Chapter 3 lays out the 
details of the formation of the so called “comparison set” within the 
framework of the JUDGEMAP-1 Model. It specifies the role of spreading 
activation in the process of judgment: namely, how the activation may 
determine the content of the comparison set. Chapter 4 describes two control 
experiments that explore the highest possible shift in judgment due to range 
(R) and frequency (Fr) of stimulus distribution in judgment of line length. 
Chapter 5 presents an attempt to increase the impact of the irrelevant 
information by varying both the R and the Fr stimulus distribution with 
respect to the irrelevant to the task dimension on line length judgments. 
Chapter 6 reports one experiment that tries to increase the influence of the 
irrelevant to the task dimension by limited stimulus presentation in judgment 
of line length. Chapter 7 presents two experiments that explore the effect of 
several correlated irrelevant dimensions.  Chapter 8 describes one experiment 
that investigates the possibility of shift in judgments due to the irrelevant 
information with abstract stimuli. Finally, Chapter 9 presents the conclusions 
from the experimental findings and suggests ideas for future work.   
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 CHAPTER 1 
Empirical Evidence for Contrast and Assimilation 
Effects 
  
The literature on the contextual effects in judgment reports two main 
shifts in the rating depending on the presented context– contrast and 
assimilation effects. They concern situations in which both the contextual and 
the target stimulus could be measured on the same scale.  Contrast refers to 
the displacement of judgments away from the values of the contextual stimuli, 
while assimilation refers to the displacement of judgments toward the values 
of the contextual stimuli. 
 
1.1. Contrast effect 
In this section, experiments resulting in contrast effect are conditionally 
separated by subsections according to the procedure used. 
 
1.1.1. Anchor placed outside stimulus series 
Several experiments used the so-called “anchor” procedure to study 
contextual effects in judgment. Generally, “anchor” means an explicit 
standard for comparison (a reference point) presented during judgment. For 
example, Sherif, Taub and Hovland (1958) demonstrated contrast effect in 
judgment of weights. A within-subject experimental design was used - each 
participant rated the same weights in two conditions: with or without an 
anchor, in addition, values of anchor were manipulated in the “anchor” 
condition. In the first session, participants were asked to lift weights one by 
one and to judge how heavy they feel them on a 6-point scale. Then, in a 
second part of the experiment, subjects lifted the same weights but coupled 
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with a standard for comparison. Each weight was presented in pair with an 
anchor weight which subjects were explicitly told to call 6. The judged 
weights were between 55 and 141 gm. When the anchor (the contextual 
stimulus) was heavier in weight (between 168gm and 347gm) than the objects 
in the regular series, the ratings of the target stimulus were reduced, i.e. 
contrast effect was observed. The judgment of the stimulus paired with an 
anchor was lower than the judgment of the same stimulus when presented 
alone.  
Sherif et al. (1958) conducted an additional experiment in order to find 
out whether the same effect would be observed if the anchor is lighter than the 
stimulus series. The weights in the stimulus series were between 75 and 
141gm. Anchoring weights (i.e., 67, 43 and 35 gm) were lighter than the 
weights in the stimulus set and were called to be equal to 1 on a 6-point scale. 
The design and instruction used were the same as in the previous experiment. 
The results were also similar, that is, contrast effect in judgment was 
observed, i.e. the same stimuli were rated higher when presented with a lighter 
anchor than without an anchor.  
Another experiment, which obtained contrast effect by the means of an 
anchor placed outside stimulus set, was conducted by Sarris and Parducci 
(1978). They compared the effect of single and multiple anchoring upon 
category rating of square sizes. In the single anchoring condition, the same 
square was presented on every anchoring trial. In the multiple anchoring 
conditions, squares with different sizes were presented on the anchoring trials. 
Participants were asked to judge the size of each square on every other trial. 
The anchoring stimulus, which was presented before each target stimulus, was 
not judged. The judgments were placed on a 9-point scale. The results show 
that in both single and multiple anchoring conditions contrast declines with 
the increasing the distance between the anchor and the target stimulus.  
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In conclusion, reviewed experiments with anchors point to several 
important observations about context effects in judgments: 
• First, anchors placed outside the regular series redefine the end points 
of the stimulus set and cause contrast effect.  
• Second, distance of the anchor to the regular series can be important for 
the degree of the contextual shift in judgment;  
• Third, the procedure for stimulus presentation was not found to 
differentiate the results.  Although, the first experiment (Sherif et al., 1958) 
used simultaneous presentation of the anchor and the target stimuli while the 
second one (Sarris and Parducci, 1978) – a sequential presentation, results 
were comparable. Both experiments found a significant contrast effect due to 
an anchor magnitude which was out of the range of stimulus magnitudes. 
 
1.1.4. Primed context 
Many experiment in the field of judgment use category priming to 
investigate contextual effects. Few of them would be presented in order to 
give an idea about various experimental situations used for studying contrast 
effect in judgment. 
• Judgment in the presence of an extreme contextual exemplar  
Herr, Sherman, and Fazio (1982) asked participants to rate the size of a 
target animal on 11-points scale during a “color perception” experiment. The 
target stimuli were always moderate in size animals - Wolf, Sheep, Pig, Goat, 
Jabo and Lemphor. The first 4 animals were examples of real animals, while 
the last 2 – of fictitious ones. This difference between the target stimuli 
(real/fictitious) was treated as similar to the distinction between the 
ambiguous and unambiguous stimuli. The unambiguous stimuli were the sizes 
of the real animals, while the ambiguous ones were the sizes of the fictitious 
animals. Contextual information was primed in the course of a "color 
perception" experiment. Context was distinguished into four levels of animal 
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sizes: extremely high, moderately high, moderately low, and extremely low 
(see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Examples of the animals used for the priming of a particular size in the experiment 
of Herr, Sherman, and Fazio. 
Primed category Mean size 
(Pretest on a 10-point scale) 
Examples 
extremely high mean=9.11 Whale, Elephant, Hippo, Rhinoceros  
moderately high mean=6.81 Antelope, Cow, Lion, Tiger  
moderately low  mean=2.93 Porcupine, Gopher, Groundhog, Cat  
extremely low mean=0.36 Snail, Flea, Minnow, Ant  
 
Whenever the target was an unambiguous stimulus (an exemplar of a 
real animal) its rating shifted away from the primed size, i.e. a contrast effect 
appears. When the target animals were ambiguous ones (fictitious: jabo and 
lemphor) and the prime animals were extremely high or extremely low 
exemplars, a contrastive shift in judgments was also observed. This, however, 
did not happen when participants judged an ambiguous target but the prime 
was moderately high or moderately low in size animal. The moderate context 
was found to result in assimilation rather than contrast in judgment of 
ambiguous target stimuli (for details, see the section about assimilation toward 
primed context).  
The same effect of an extreme prime was obtained in judgment of face 
attractiveness. For example, Kenrick and Gutierres (1980) found contrast 
effect in judgment of an average target face when it was presented after a 
highly attractive face. In the first experiment participants who were watching 
“Charlie’s Angels" were asked after the end of this TV program to judge the 
beauty of a moderately attractive female faces on a 7-point scale. The main 
characters in “Charlie’s Angels" were 3 highly beautiful women. Participants 
in the control group were also asked to judge the same faces but after 
watching another TV program. The same face received a lower rating (3.34) 
from the watchers of "Charlie's Angels" than from the controls (4.00). 
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The same result was obtained when contextual face appeared during the 
instruction. Participants were asked to rate a female face of average 
attractiveness along several bipolar scales. The target scale was beautiful-ugly. 
Half of the participants saw a picture of a very beautiful female face during 
the instruction, the others – did not. Those participants who saw the beautiful 
woman before assessing the beauty of the target face underestimated the test 
face in comparison with participants who did not see the beautiful face.  
Thus, priming of an extreme exemplar could be considered as resulting 
in contrastive shift in judgment of a moderate target. Similarly to the previous 
section about contrast due to an anchor, a contextual stimulus, the magnitude 
of which is out of the stimulus magnitudes seems to cause contrast effect in 
judgment.    
 
• Contrast in judgment of a target stimulus belonging to a category 
associated with an extreme stereotype 
Few experiments focused on judgment depending on an existing 
stereotype. All of them start with an induction series for establishing a 
stereotype and a test series for judgment of stereotyped and non-stereotyped 
stimuli.  For example, Manis, Nelson and Shedler (1988) conducted an 
experiment in order to test how the extremity of the existing stereotypes 
influences social judgment. During the induction phase participants were 
asked to judge the pathology of statements coming from Metropolitan or 
Central Hospital. The statements from one of the hospitals were always 
normal, while the statements generated from patients of the other hospital 
were 100% extremely pathological. In this manner an extreme stereotype 
toward a particular hospital was established - Metropolitan or Central 
Hospital. During the test session, participants were asked to choose the more 
pathological case within a pair of moderate in pathology statements. One of 
the cases was originated from a patient of a Metropolitan Hospital and the 
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other - from the Central Hospital. If the participants had participated in the 
induction part of the experiment when an extreme stereotype about 
Metropolitan Hospital had been established, they would choose as more 
pathological the test statement from the other hospital (Central Hospital). On 
the contrary, statements from Metropolitan Hospital were chosen when an 
extreme stereotype toward the Central Hospital had been induced. Because 
both statements in the test pairs were with moderate pathology, the results 
were interpreted as showing contrast effect due to an extreme stereotype for a 
particular Hospital. Contrast, however, was observed only when the stereotype 
was an extreme one otherwise assimilation appeared (see section for 
assimilation toward primed context).  
This experiment shows once again that the extremity of the context is 
very important even in judgment of such complex entities like clinical cases. 
Moreover, context itself was a quite complex stimulus, i.e., a particular 
stereotype concerning the level of patient’s pathology in a hospital. 
 
• Context excluded from the representation of the target 
The last study in this section concerns also judgment of complex social 
stimuli like participant’s current happiness and life satisfaction. Strack, 
Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985) show contrast effects in judgment of 
happiness and satisfaction when preceded by the recall of 3 positive or 3 
negative past events. When participants were induced to think about 3 
negative events from their remote past, they judged their current happiness 
and satisfaction as higher (on 11-point scale) than participants who recalled 3 
positive remote past events first. In contrast, participants who were first asked 
to recall 3 positive recent events assessed their current happiness and life 
satisfaction higher (on 11-point scale) then Ss who recalled 3 negative recent 
events. The authors interpret these results in favor of the inclusion-exclusion 
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theory - contrast appears when the context is excluded from the target's 
representation. 
 
To summarize, priming of particular contextual information may result 
in contrast effect if the prime information is an extreme one. Extreme 
exemplars are able to push away the judgments of unambiguous stimuli and of 
ambiguous and moderate exemplars of the same category. However, in case of 
ambiguous stimuli (Herr et al., 1980) assimilation effect could be obtained. It 
should be noted that it is not clear what is assumed to be an ambiguous 
stimulus – something having several meanings for the same person or having 
different meaning for different people (for discussion, see Herr et al., 1980). 
This vagueness may lead to confounding variables and possibly invalidate the 
results. Unambiguous stimuli, on the other hand, are more likely to be 
displaced away from the active contextual information independently of its 
extremity (Herr et al., 1980).   
 
1.1.3. Contrast depending on a set of stimuli 
Many experiments demonstrated that context could be a set of all 
presented stimuli rather than a single stimulus. This research line was initiated 
from Parducci in the 60s (Parducci, 1965, 1968,1974). Just few experiments 
testing the influence of context considered as a set of sequentially presented 
stimuli would be briefly reviewed here. 
• Range of the stimulus distribution 
Parducci and Perret (1971) demonstrated contrast due to a change in the range 
of the stimulus set.  The results showed that despite the same mean of the 
stimulus series, judgments of the same square (with the same width, projected 
on the same screen) differ significantly depending on the range of the stimulus 
distribution. For example, stimulus distribution that includes squares 1, 3, 5, 9, 
13, 17, 20, 22 and 24 has the same mean as the set of squares with sizes 1, 2, 
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4, 7, 11, 14, 17, 20 and 22. Each number of a square stands for a size, which is 
1.16 times bigger then the previous square from in the set of 24 squares. The 
judgment was made on a 9-point scale. The mean judgments of the common 
stimuli for the two conditions are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The mean judgment of the sizes of the common squares depending on the 
experimental condition. 
Stimuli Range 1  
(from 1 to 24) 
Range 2 
(from 1 to 22) 
1 1.09 1.10 
17 4.45 5.00 
20 5.60 6.47 
22 6.80 7.88 
 
The second distribution was restricted with respect to the first one. The 
ends of the first distribution were 1 and 24, while for the second distribution 
they were 1 and 22. As if a square number 24 was added in the first set. The 
effect was reducing the rating of the rest of the squares in the first set, the so-
called “contrast effect”. Contrast due to variations in the range of the stimulus 
set was demonstrated with various stimuli with different complexity, i.e. in 
judgments of physical attractiveness (Wedded, Parducci and Geiselman, 
1978), in clinical judgments (Wedell, Parducci and Lane, 1990), judgments of 
class performance (Mellers and Cooke, 1994). 
Thus, the range of the stimulus set may be considered as creating 
context for judgment of each particular stimulus within this set. The next 
section will review several studies demonstrating that the frequency of the 
stimuli within the stimulus set may also matter.    
 
• Frequency of the stimulus distribution 
Many experiments initiated by Parducci indicate how judgment depends 
on the frequency of the stimulus presentation within the whole set of stimuli 
that has to be judged. For example, Parducci and Perret (1971) demonstrated 
how violations in the frequency of the distribution of several squares with 
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different sizes result in the different ratings of the same square. Consider the 
situation of having three sets of nine squares with equal ranges, i.e. the 
smallest and the largest square in these sets are identical. The only difference 
between these sets is the frequency of square’s presentation. In set 1, all nine 
squares are presented equally often (9 times each) forming a uniform 
distribution of stimuli. In set 2, small squares were presented more frequently 
than larger squares, forming a positively skewed set. In set 3, larger squares 
are presented with higher frequency than smaller ones, forming a negatively 
skewed set. Participants were asked to rate the size of each square “in 
comparison with the other squares” on a 6-point scale (p.433, Parducci and 
Perrett, 1971). Results show a significant contrast effect in judgments of the 
common stimuli depending on the stimulus distribution. In the positively 
skewed distribution, ratings of all squares shifted upward, while in the 
negatively skewed distribution – downward (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Ratings of the common stimuli in 3 of the experimental conditions in the study of 
Parducci and Perret. 
Stimuli Normally 
skewed set 
Positively 
skewed set 
Negatively 
skewed set 
1 1.09 1.05 1.00 
3 1.62 1.47  
7  2.30 1.60 
19  4.45 3.34 
22 6.80  4.56 
24 8.21 5.83 5.67 
 
Wedell, Parducci and Geiselman (1987) obtained contrast effect due to 
the frequency of the distribution in judgment of physical attractiveness. 
Participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of female faces on 5 and 101-
point scale. The stimuli were drawn from a set of 118 photographic slides of 
female faces that were previously rated on a 5-point attractiveness scale. The 
stimuli were distinguished into seven groups from less attractive to very 
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attractive female faces. Less attractive faces predominate in the positively 
skewed set, while more faces that were very attractive were included in the 
negatively skewed set.  
Stimuli were presented sequentially and in random order except the ten 
test stimuli, which appeared always at the same position in both experimental 
conditions. The effect of the skew of the stimulus distribution was measured 
trough the ten common stimuli for both skews. Contrast effect of skewing was 
significant - the same faces were rated higher in the positive condition and 
lower in the negative one. The effect decreases from the 5-point scale to 101-
point scale but was still significant in the latter.  
The same context effect due to density distribution of the stimulus set 
was reported with stimuli with different complexity, e.g. clinical judgments 
(Wedell et al., 1990), and class performance (Mellers and Cooke, 1994). 
 
• Contrast due to the frequency in multiattribute judgment  
Cooke and Mellers (1998) demonstrated contrast due to the frequency 
of the stimuli along one out of 3 target dimensions. Participants were asked to 
judge an offer for a rent of an apartment described on three dimensions - price, 
distance from campus and friend's opinion. The distribution over one of the 
target dimensions (either distance or rent) was skewed while the distribution 
over the other two were uniform. When the distance was skewed (given as 
walking time in minutes) and the remote offers predominated, the ranks of the 
middle stimuli increased, and the opposite, when near apartments 
predominated in the list, the offers from the middle part of the stimulus 
distribution were perceived as worse by subjects. Similar results appear in the 
rent condition (positively and negatively skewed distributions with respect to 
rent). 
Mellers and Birnbaum (1981) tried to differentiate the possible 
mechanism for contextual effect in judgments of two-dimensional stimuli, 
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which were skewed on both target dimensions: test scores on two exams 
(Exam1 and Exam2). The scores on both exams were skewed either positively 
(the low ratings on both exams predominated) or negatively (the high ratings 
on both exams predominated). Participants were asked to judge the overall 
performance of each student on a 9-point scale. Each stimulus consisted of 
two numerical values that depicted the two test scores.  
The data for the 40 scores common for both conditions was compared. 
The authors argue that the distribution of the total scores affects only the 
transformation from the integrated impression to the overt response. Judges 
were sensitive to contextual information while combining their own 
judgments for the two exams into a rating for a student’s overall performance. 
The effect of visualization of the stimulus skew (i.e., some of the participants 
were shown a histogram of the exam's distribution) was minimal. 
This explanation, however, does not seem appropriate for cross-
modality judgments, i.e., judgments of stimuli from two different dimensions. 
Mellers and Birnbaum (1982) asked participants to rate the "total intensity" of 
both stimuli (i.e., density of dot-patterns and size of circles) on a scale from 0 
(the intensity is very very low) to 90 (the intensity is very very high). The 
darker the dot-pattern and the larger the circle, the greater the "total intensity" 
of the stimuli was. Six circles with diameters between 7.6 and 25.4 mm were 
combined with one of four distributions of dot-patterns (medium range, wide 
range, positively skewed, negatively skewed). Like in the previous 
experiment, judgments of 6 common pairs of stimuli were compared across 
the four experimental conditions. Results were interpreted as being in favor of 
the hypothesis that context influences judgment on each dimension separately 
rather than the integrated impression of both dimensions. Participants judged 
the intensity of each circle (size) and dot pattern (darkness) separately and 
depending on the distribution of the circle's sizes and dot darkness, 
respectively.  
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 In conclusion, this review suggests that judgment can be sensitive to 
properties of the whole set like the range and even the density of the stimulus 
distribution. The effect of the range seems to be similar to the effect of an 
anchor and the extreme primed context described in the previous sections, i.e. 
context changes the range of the stimulus set and causes contrast effect. This 
effect declines with increasing the distance between the context and the 
stimulus set. Contrast due to both a range and a frequency violation was 
repeatedly demonstrated independently of the stimulus complexity and the 
number of the judged dimensions (e.g., multiattribute judgments). It could be, 
however, that the size of the observed effect was a result of the explicit 
instruction to judge each stimulus with respect to the rest, rather than only 
from manipulations of the range and frequency of the stimulus distribution. 
Unfortunately, this question remains open. 
 
1.1.4. Contrast due to the irrelevant information 
Unlike the experiments reviewed in the previous sections, the few 
studies presented here show contrast in judgment depending on an irrelevant 
to the task dimension. The irrelevant dimension was considered as a context in 
judgment of the stimulus along the relevant (target) one. 
Goldstone (1995) reported contrast effect on adjustment of the color of 
a stimulus depending on the range of the stimuli that possess a different 
irrelevant dimension. The relevant dimension was the color of the stimuli, 
which ranges from red to violet. The irrelevant dimension was the form and 
direction that the figures faced. Examples of the stimulus material in two 
controls and one of the experimental conditions are shown in Figure1. 
Participants were asked to adjust the color of a five-sided polygon with 
right-pointing prongs (polygons A, B and C) in order to match the color of 
another figure. The standard figures actually depicted the context in this 
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experiment. Both contextual and target figures were five-sided polygons but 
they differed in the pointing direction of their prongs. The prongs of the 
standard polygons pointed upwards. This situation is illustrated in the lower 
part of fig. 1. The adjusted color of polygon C was slightly different from the 
color of the standard polygons. For example, if the color of the standard 
polygons was predominantly red, the color of the target polygon was adjusted 
to be more violet than the standard’s color. The adjusted color of C was more 
violet than the adjusted color of A (the colors of the two controls A, B did not 
differ). This result indicates contrast in the adjustment of C with the color of 
the rest of the polygons. Thus, the C polygon was probably excluded from the 
set of red up-pointing polygons and was perceived as more violet than it 
actually was. 
 
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli used in 3 conditions of Goldstone’s (1995) experiment. The 
shading of the figures indicates their color- darker figures are red, lighter ones are violet. 
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Another example of contrast effect obtained through differentiating the 
range of the stimuli depending on an irrelevant to the task dimension was the 
experiment by Arieh and Marks (2002). Participants were asked to judge 
length of lines (vertical and horizontal lines). The irrelevant dimension was 
the orientation of the lines – vertical or horizontal. Context A comprises 
relatively long vertical and short horizontal lines, whereas Context B 
comprised relatively short verticals and long horizontals. The length of the 
stimulus lines presenting in context A and context B are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4.The lengths of stimulus lines depending on the context. 
Experimental 
conditions 
Lengths of the stimulus lines 
Vertical 
 lines 
  1.9cm 2.85cm 4.12cm 6.0cm Context 
A 
Horizontal  
lines 
0.65cm 0.95cm 1.9cm 2.85cm   
Vertical 
 lines 
0.65cm 0.95cm 1.9cm 2.85cm   Context 
B 
Horizontal  
lines 
  1.9cm 2.85cm 4.12cm 6.0cm 
 
The lines of a middle length, i.e. the ones with length 1.9 and 2.85cm 
were common for all contexts and were presented both in vertical and 
horizontal position.  The common lines presented within Context A received 
lower ratings when they were presented vertically than horizontally on the 
screen. On the contrary, the same lines shown in Context B were estimated as 
longer when presented vertically than horizontally. The size of the horizontal-
vertical illusion (HVI) was reduced by 7.15% under contextual condition A 
and was enlarged by 5.75% under Contextual Condition B compared with the 
base line condition. These effects were called “differential context effects” 
(DCEs).  
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A series of further experiments (Arieh and Marks, 2002) tested the 
spatial specificities of the DCEs with the same stimuli (vertical and horizontal 
lines).  The visual field was divided into 4 quadrants and the contextual set of 
vertical and horizontal lines was induced in just one of them. The effect was 
underestimating the long vertical lines in condition A and the long horizontal 
lines presented in condition B. Thus, it seems that DCE did not transfer from 
the specific part of the visual field to another. If the contextually induced set 
of lines, however, was presented to the same part of the fovea, the effect was 
found in different regions of the external visual space. The possibility for 
projecting the lines on relatively the same place of the retina was controlled 
through the instruction to look always to a cross that appears before the lines. 
The lines that comprise context A were projected at one spatial location and 
the stimulus lines from context B were presented at another. Participants 
judged a random sample of the lines from Context A and B. Thus, if the effect 
from Context A was transferred to the judgments of the lines of Context B, the 
effect should be cancelled out. Results showed that the magnitudes of the HVI 
obtained in Context A, Context B and the base line were all similar in size. 
According to the authors, these results demonstrate that DCA is produced at 
the retinal level.  
The DCE was repeatedly demonstrated with different stimuli: e.g., in 
judgment of length of vertical and horizontal lines (Potts, 1991), taste (Rankin 
and Marks, 1991, 1992), haptic touch (Marks and Armstrong, 1996) and 
olfaction (Rankin and Marks, 2000).  
 
To conclude, context could be presented by the means of an irrelevant 
to the task stimulus dimension. It was argued that this effect was a result from 
low level processes like sensory adaptation or perceptual learning. Goldstone 
(1995) demonstrated, however, that slight differences in the stimulus set could 
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result in assimilation of the same target rather than in contrast (for details, see 
section for assimilation due to the irrelevant information). 
 
1.1.5. Summary and discussion of the empirical data for contrast 
effect 
Most of the studies that reveal contrast effect in judgment actually 
manipulate the range and the frequency of the stimulus set. Moreover, changes 
in range and frequency of the stimuli seem to describe quite well both 
contrasts with simple and complex stimuli (Parducci and Perret, 1971; Mellers 
and Birnbaum, 1981; Wedell, et al., 1987; Manis et al., 1988).  
The distinction of the levels of contextual influences seems to be 
important and profitable one. If particular channels are responsible for 
processing particular contextual information or at least some effects could be 
observed on this level, it is possible to find some particular contextually 
sensitive mechanism of processing of the input information. For example, 
Marks and his collaborators (Marks, 1988, 1992, 1994; Marks and Warner, 
1991) argue for contextually sensitive adaptation. Goldstone (1995) discussed 
the possibility that the contextual influence on the input information is a form 
of perceptual learning. The effects of lower level information processing, 
however, are hardly traceable to the higher levels. It is difficult to predict how 
contextually dependent judgment of the length of lines reported by Arieh and 
Marks (2002) would affect judgment of woman attractiveness. Moreover, it is 
quite possible that the effects from the lower level blot out on the upper level. 
For example, the assimilation toward a perceptually similar category 
demonstrated by Goldstone (1995) may counter-balance the contrast found at 
the level of human receptors. It could be, however, that context influences 
judgment on different levels – both lower and higher levels of information 
processing. 
 
 18
1.2. Empirical Evidences for Assimilation Effect 
Several groups of experiments demonstrating assimilation effect in 
judgment are reviewed in this section.  Like in the previous section for 
contrast effect, empirical data was divided into groups of studies using similar 
experimental procedure.  
 
1.2.1. Anchor placed inside the stimulus series 
A few of the experiments showing assimilation of simple stimuli to the 
current context rely on the anchoring procedure.  For example, Sherif et al. 
(1958) obtain assimilation of the judgments of the stimulus series toward the 
anchor (a standard for comparison), which was equal to the heaviest or the 
lightest stimulus in the original series. Each subject rated once each of the 
stimulus weights alone and then coupled with an anchor on a 6-point scale. 
When the weight of the anchor was equal to the heaviest stimulus in stimulus 
set (141gm) judgments of the stimuli were higher than judgments of the same 
stimuli presented alone. 
The same effect was observed when the anchor was equal to the lighter 
weights in the original series. An assimilation of the rating of the stimuli in the 
stimulus series toward the value of the anchor was observed. 
The experiments of Sherif et al. were replicated by Parducci and 
Marshall (1962) and the same shift in judgment was observed except for the 
lighter anchor condition, where judgments of the stimuli in the original 
stimulus series did not differ significantly from judgments of the same stimuli 
presented without an anchor.  
 
In sum, both experiments briefly described in this section reveal the 
possibility for assimilation to be a consequence from an anchoring stimulus 
belonging to the range of stimulus set – in fact, assimilation was 
unambiguously obtained only when the anchor was equal to the heaviest 
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stimulus in the stimulus series. Unfortunately, the results are not so definite 
about the assimilation toward the lightest member in the stimulus set. This 
casts some doubt on the general conclusion that an anchor that belongs to the 
stimulus set causes an assimilation, while an anchor that does not – a contrast 
effect.   
 
1.2.2. Primed context  
Most of the experiments showing assimilation effect in judgment used 
priming of particular contextual information. These studies usually require 
judgment of ambiguous or complex stimuli.  
• Assimilation of the ambiguous target toward moderately low/high 
context with respect to the judgment dimension 
An experiment of Herr, Sherman, and Fazio (1983) demonstrates 
assimilation of an ambiguous target to the moderate context. They primed 4 
types of animal sizes: Extremely high, Moderately high, Moderately low, 
Extremely low and asked participants to rate the size of 2 ambiguous target 
animals (fictitious) on the 11-point scale (for examples, see table 1 in section 
about contrast due to primed context).  
When the primed stimuli were animals of moderately high or 
moderately low size targets’ ratings were assimilated toward them. The 
opposite contrast effect, however, appeared when the primed context was an 
extreme one (extremely high or extremely low, for details, see the section 
about contrast).  
 
• Assimilation in judgment of an ambiguous target toward the accessible 
contextual information 
Srull and Wyer (1979) studied how judgment of an ambiguous target 
may depend on the accessible context. The accessibility of a certain trait was 
manipulated through a sentence-construction task, i.e. to choose 3 out of 4 
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words that would make a complete sentence. Some of them primed hostility 
others did not (fillers). For example, "leg break arm his" conveys hostility, 
while "her found knew I" does not. Then participants were asked to read a 
short text describing the stimulus person (Donald) whose behavior was 
ambiguous with respect to the primed concept. The task was to form an 
impression of the target person and to rate him on a 10-point scale along a 
series of different trait dimensions. Six of the dimensions implied either high 
or low hostility (hostile, unfriendly, dislikable, kind, considerate, thoughtful), 
and the rest of them - were descriptively unrelated to the primed concept 
(boring, selfish, narrow-minded, dependable, interesting, and intelligent).  
Ratings of the Donald's behavior along the hostility dimensions 
increased with the number of times hostility-related concepts had previously 
been activated. The ambiguous with respect to hostility Donald’s behavior 
was rated as more hostile depending on how accessible the concept was. The 
effect of priming decreases with the time-interval (immediate, after 1 hour, 
after 24 hours) between the priming task and presentation of Donald's 
behavior. The same results following the same procedure were obtained with 
the priming of kindness. 
 
• Assimilation on the encoding stage of information processing  
Srull and Wyer (1980) studied when the contextual influence takes 
place on encoding stage or during the integration of information. The 
procedure and stimulus material were identical to the study described above. 
First, priming of hostility, second, acquisition of Donald's behavior and third, 
judgment of the target person along several dimensions (6 trait dimensions 
that convey hostility and 6 trait dimensions, which were not related to it). 
When participants experienced a delay between the activation of the trait 
category and the acquisition of Donald’s behavior, their ratings along the 
hostility dimensions increased with the number of the presentations of the 
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priming category but decreased with the length of the delay. On the contrary, 
when participants experienced a delay between acquisition of the stimulus 
behavior and judgment of this behavior, their ratings increased with both the 
number of prior activations and the length of the delay. However, when the 
trait category was activated after acquisition of the stimulus behavior, none of 
these effects occurs. Authors interpret these results as an evidence for the 
influence of the context on encoding the information upon judgment. 
 
• Expectation-driven assimilation 
Several experiments focus on assimilation toward a stereotype. These 
studies start with an induction series of creating a particular stereotype. Then a 
judgment of stimuli that belongs or not to the stereotyped category is required. 
For example, Manis, Nelson, and Shedler (1988) study the influence of the 
stereotypes (extreme/moderate) on the choice of a more pathological 
statement within a pair of midscale in pathology items. During the induction 
phase a stereotype with different intensity to either Central or Metropolitan 
Hospital was created. The extremity of the induced stereotype was controlled 
through the percentage of the extremely pathological statements presented 
during the induction phase (52%, 68%, 84%, or 100%). Participants' task was 
to choose the more pathological case within a pair of midscale statements and 
to evaluate their confidence about the choice they made on a 7-point scale.  
Although the test items from both hospitals were chosen to be 
moderate, participants who received in the induction part 52%, 68%, or 84% 
extremely pathological statements consistently chose as more pathological the 
statements that originated from the stereotyped hospital. Authors call this 
effect assimilation toward the stereotype. It was observed only when the 
stereotype was moderate while for the extreme one a contrast was observed. 
Moreover, the assimilation was higher when the stereotype was established 
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through 52% distorted statements than if the induction series included 68% or 
84% extreme in distortion items.  
Manis and Paskewitz (1984) induced a stereotype by presenting a set of 
highly pathological statements to part of the participants and low in pathology 
statements to the others. Participants were asked to judge whether each 
statement was produced by a schizophrenic person or not.  Then both groups 
received the same moderate in pathology test items - 30 definitions rated on 
the pretest between 4.1 and 7.8 on an 11-point scale. Part of the participants 
was asked to “guess” the number of schizophrenic patients in the subsequent 
test series and whether the next patient is schizophrenic or not. 
The respondents’ general expectation for the overall test series was 
consistent with the type of statements they were presented in the induction 
phase. Participants who rated highly pathological statements expected the rest 
of the statements to be highly pathological, while participants who rated low 
pathology definitions first expected the rest of the definitions to come also 
from patients with low pathology. Guesses before each trial followed the same 
fashion - they were congruent with the type of definitions that was presented 
in the induction series. Moreover, the correlation between guesses (either for 
the overall degree of pathology in the test sample or trail-by-trial expectations) 
and subsequent judgments of the amount of thought distortion was consistent 
and positive but quite low (from 0.07 to 0.18).  
Similar expectation driven assimilation was reported also in judgment 
of the height (Manis, Biernat and Nelson, 1991) and judgment of self and 
others (Biernat, Manis, and Kobrynovicz, 1997).  
 
• Context included in the representation of the target 
Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985, experiment1) asked 
participants to write about 3 recent events or 3 events from the past. Part of 
the Ss was instructed to think about positive events, while the other part - 
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about negative events. Then, participants judged their happiness and life 
satisfaction along an 11-point scale. Ss who recalled 3 positive recent events 
rated their happiness and satisfaction as being higher then participants who 
recalled 3 negative recent events first. Participants who recalled 3 negative 
recent events assessed themselves lower on both dimensions then participants 
who recalled 3 negative past events. Authors argue that when the activated 
information belongs to the judged period judgment is assimilated to it. On the 
contrary, when the activated contextual information is excluded from the 
judged category a contrast could appear. Participants who were induced to 
think about 3 positive events from the past then rate themselves as less happy 
than participants who first recalled 3 negative past events or 3 positive recent 
events.  
 
To conclude, experiments reviewed in this section demonstrate 
assimilation toward an available category, which represents the context of 
judgment. Usually such experiments rely on judgment of moderate target 
stimulus within a moderate context. The exception, however, was the 
experiment of Herr et al. (1983), where the judged stimuli were ambiguous 
(fictitious) animals. Their ratings were assimilated only to the moderate but 
not to the extreme context. Thus, the reported experimental result may be 
roughly summarized in the following way: judgments can be assimilated 
toward the activated contextual information when the target and the contextual 
stimulus belong to the same category.  
 
1.2.3. Sequential effects 
Correlation between the ratings or the values of the current and previous 
stimulus is known as sequential assimilation. Stimuli are overestimated when 
judgment of the prior stimulus was high and are underestimated when 
judgment of the prior stimulus was low. Sequence effects seem to be quite 
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robust (Ward, 1973, 1979; Jesteadt, Luce and Green, 1977; Lockheed, 1992; 
Petrov and Anderson, 2000, 2005). Such effects are found independently of 
stimulus complexity. For example, Lockhead (1992) studied the integral 
nature of bivariate stimuli (auditory tones with loudness and pitch) through the 
sequence effect. He argues that people cannot attend only to the target 
attribute neglecting the rest attributes of the stimuli but rather they process the 
entire stimulus before abstracting the attribute value. Lockhead designed a set 
of 10 tones with two nonlinearly correlated characteristics: loudness 
(amplitude of 79 to 88 dB SPL in 1dB steps) and pitch (frequency of 1.000 to 
1,045 Hz in 5Hz steps). Each amplitude was paired consecutively with a 
particular frequency.  Participants were asked to identify only the intensity of 
each tone on a 10-point scale. The data shows that sequence effect reflects the 
bivariate space. Judgments of each tone tend to be assimilated toward the 
value of the previous bivariate stimulus. The sequence effect was not detected 
only for the target dimension (intensity of the tones) but rather for the 
combination of both stimulus characteristics (amplitude and pitch). The 
assimilation toward the previous response was greater for no-feedback than 
for the feedback condition but the assimilation toward the value of the prior 
stimulus was greater for the feedback than for the no-feedback condition. 
Response time (RT) also depends on sequence - judgments are faster when 
successive stimuli were more similar (the Euclidian distance in the frequency-
amplitude space).  
 
To sum up, Lockhead’s (1992) experiment draws attention to several 
things: 
• First, sequential assimilation can be found both in ratings and in stimuli 
themselves; 
• Second, feedback/no-feedback conditions may determine whether 
assimilation would be toward the previous rating or toward the value of the 
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previous stimulus. In no-feedback conditions assimilation toward the 
previous response was greater than for the feedback condition; 
• Third, judgments reflect characteristics of the whole stimulus rather 
than only the target attributes; 
• Fourth, RT in judgment depends on the similarity between the 
successive stimuli. 
 
1.2.4. Assimilation due to an averaging between simultaneously 
presented stimuli 
A body of research initiated by Anderson (1966) demonstrates 
assimilation due to an averaging between simultaneously presented stimuli 
and context.  Anderson argued that the reported assimilation seemed to be 
independent of stimulus ambiguity.  
 
• Component ratings in the impression formation task 
Anderson (1966, 1971b) found an assimilation effect in judgment of the 
likeability of personal traits toward the value of the contextual ones. He asked 
people to rate first, the likeability of each person described by 3 adjectives on 
a 9-point scale and then to judge how likable/dislikable is one of the aspects 
(the test adjective) of the person on a 20-point scale. The other two adjectives 
actually represent the context in these experiments. Both the test and 
contextual adjectives were divided into 4 groups: H (highly favorable), M+ 
(moderately favorable), M- (moderately unfavorable) and L (highly 
unfavorable). Ratings of target adjectives vary with context. For example, the 
rating of the same H adjective decreases from 16.6 in the context of two H 
adjectives to 14.1 in the L context. The author interprets these results as a 
positive context effect, i.e., judgment of the component was displaced toward 
the value of the other traits of the person presented simultaneously on a card. 
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In another experiment (Anderson et al., 1973) participants received 3 
pairs of adjectives per card, but each pair described a different person. They 
had to rate (1) attractiveness of each person in a group, (2) attractiveness of 
the group as a whole, and (3) importance of each member in the group. The 
judged attractiveness of each member in the group rose or became lower 
depending on the attractiveness of the other two persons of the group. When 
the test person was described as a leader, his/hers attractiveness became even 
more positive in the context of 2 very attractive adjectives and more negative 
in the context of two very unattractive adjectives. The judgment of the group 
attractiveness was the average of the attractiveness of all members of the 
group and could increase when the test person was described as a leader. 
 
• Assimilation of the ambiguous target toward the available context  
Another set of experiments goes into contextual shift in judgments of 
ambiguous target (a target with more than 1 meaning). In contrast to 
Anderson1 (1965, 1971b, 1973), researchers who work in this direction 
consider adjectives as having variety of interpretations. The context 
determines which interpretations of the adjectives are inappropriate. Wyer 
(1974) demonstrates an increasing contextual influence upon judgment of an 
ambiguous target with the rise in the ambiguity of the target stimulus. The test 
adjectives were divided with a pretest into moderately high in likableness 
adjectives (M+), neutral in likableness adjectives (0) and moderately low in 
likableness adjectives (M-) and in the same time into High and Low in 
ambiguity adjectives. For example, high in ambiguity and moderately high in 
likableness adjectives were cautious, ingenious, intellectual. Low in ambiguity 
and moderately high in likableness adjectives were innocent, courteous and 
healthy. High in ambiguity and moderately low in likableness adjectives were 
loud-mouthed, ill-tempered, sarcastic. Low in ambiguity and moderately low 
                                                          
1 Anderson claimed that the meaning of the adjectives is contextual-free. 
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in likableness adjectives were self-centered, troublesome, showy. These types 
of ambiguous stimuli were grouped with four groups of unambiguous 
contextual adjectives: H (high in likableness), M+ (moderately high in 
likableness), M- (moderately low in likableness) and L (low in likableness).  
Participants were told that each set of three adjectives (1 ambiguous+2 
unambiguous) describe a particular person and their task was first, to estimate 
how well they like him/her and then, how well they like a particular trait of 
that person (represented by the test adjective) on a 10-point scale. The ratings 
of the ambiguous test adjectives increased with the favorableness of the 
contextual pair of the personality adjectives. For example, adjectives from the 
test group M- were rated as more likable when they were presented with 2 
high in likableness unambiguous adjectives than two moderate or law in 
likableness personality adjectives. An ambiguous test adjective that came 
from group M+ received lower ratings when it was coupled with a contextual 
pair from the low in likableness adjectives and so on.   Moreover, contextual 
effect increased with the ambiguity of the test adjectives. Thus, Anderson’s 
(1965, 1971b, 1973) averaging seems to depend also on the ambiguity of the 
target stimuli. The ratings of the high in ambiguity adjectives were assimilated 
more toward the meaning of the contextual stimuli then the ratings of the low 
in ambiguity adjectives.  
 
• Assimilation within a pair of stimuli 
Like in Anderson’s (1965, 1971b) experiment, Wedell et al., (1987) 
found assimilation between simultaneously presented stimuli. They designed 
pairs of female faces. Six pairs were contextual ones and consisted only of 
high, moderate or low in attractiveness faces. Another 6 pairs were test one 
and comprised one moderate in attractiveness face and one contextual that was 
either high or low in attractiveness female face. Assimilation was found in the 
ratings of the faces within each of the 6 test pairs. The same face was judged 
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as more beautiful when presented with a highly beautiful face within the test 
pair and as less beautiful, when the contextual face in the test pair was low in 
attractiveness. In order to facilitate assimilation participants were told that 
each pair of faces represents "friends from the high school". Another implicit 
factor for the assimilation within each test pair was probably the procedure for 
skewing the stimulus distribution by the firs six contextual pairs. Faces in 
these pairs were always drawn from the same group of attractiveness (high, 
moderate or low in attractiveness faces), which may implicitly to predispose 
participants that the next 6 pairs are also including comparable in 
attractiveness faces.  Authors interpreted the observed assimilation similar to 
the averaging found in Anderson’s studies. 
 
In conclusion, experiments reviewed in this section rely on the specific 
instruction that the simultaneously presented stimuli have something in 
common, e.g. “traits of the same person”, “traits of group members” or 
“friends in the high school”. Thus a question about what causes assimilation 
remains, namely, whether the simultaneous presentation or the specific 
instruction is responsible for the obtained assimilation. 
 
1.2.5.  Assimilation due to an irrelevant to the task dimension 
Goldstone (1995) found a significant assimilation effect in color 
perception. This effect appeared both toward some existing conceptual 
categories which were irrelevant to the task and to contextually sensitive on-
line groupings of the stimuli depending on their irrelevant characteristics.   
In the first experiment, participants were asked to level the color of a 
black object to the color of a particular sample. Samples were letters and 
numerals, which color ranged from red to violet, however, the color of the 
letters was more reddish than the color of the numerals.  
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Judgment of the color of the sample was made on the objective 
continuum of the hue between red and violet.  Participants report their 
judgments by means of the color chosen for the second identically shaped 
object. The context in this experiment was the irrelevant to the task category 
of the sample and the modified object (letters and numerals). When letters and 
numerals with the same physical color were samples in the experiment, the 
modified color of the target stimuli was more reddish for letters and more 
violet for numerals. The color of the target was assimilated toward the 
categories of “red letters” and “violet numerals”. 
The same assimilation was obtained when the stimuli were five-sided 
polygons and two-line branches. Judgments on their color were found to 
depend on an on-line categorization of the stimuli depending on the irrelevant 
to the task shape. For example, if the polygons were judged within a set of 
two-lined branches and five-sided polygons its color was adjusted with respect 
to the color of the rest of the polygons presented in a particular experiment. 
Moreover, participants were inclined to judge the color of the target stimulus 
depending on the perceptual similarity between the rest of the stimuli. When 
among the stimuli was only one polygon except the target one, the color of the 
target stimulus was adjusted toward the color of the other polygon. However, 
if the color of the same target polygon was judged within a sample of other 
polygons, its color was adjusted in the opposite direction – a contrast effect 
due to the dissimilarity between the target and the other polygons with prongs 
pointing in different direction (for more details, see section about contrast 
effect). 
 
These experiments demonstrate assimilation effect at the level of 
perception of the object’s color. Participants judge the color of the objects 
depending on contextually sensitive categories. Moreover, it seems that 
participants spontaneously create such on-line categories depending on some 
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irrelevant to the current task dimension like the shape or the conceptual 
identity of the objects.    
 
1.2.6. Summary and discussion of empirical data that reveals 
assimilation effect 
Empirical data that reveals assimilation effect does not fall easily into 
any grouping. Different researchers imply different meaning of context. Some 
of them perceive context as the most accessible and applicable information 
(Srull and Wyer, 1979, 1980), others specify that such information could be 
elicited from memory (Strack et al., 1985). Third part, comprehend context as 
external stimulus, e.g. stimulus presented simultaneously with the target one 
(e.g., Anderson, 1966, 1971; Wedell et al., 1987; Goldstone, 1995), stimulus 
presented successively to the target one  (e.g., Sherif et al., 1958; Parducci and 
Marshall, 1962; Mellers and Birnbaum, 1982), or prime stimulus (e.g., Barg 
and Pietromonaco, 1982; Herr et al., 1982).  Moreover, some data reveals 
assimilation of ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Herr et al., 1982; Srull and Wyer, 
1980), other data - of unambiguous ones (e.g., Sherif et al., 1958; Parducci 
and Perrett, 1971, Goldstone, 1995). These substantial distinctions in the 
existing experimental studies are a challenging obstacle for any classification. 
Thus, the only criterion that seems to generalize the findings described so far 
sounds quite abstract –if the current context is affiliated with the target 
category the judgment of the target could be assimilated towards it.  
It is important to mention that affiliation to a particular category in the 
judgment could be considered as contextually dependent (Goldstone, 1995). 
Category membership is assigned or not to a certain stimulus depending on 
the current context. The same stimulus could be categorized differently in 
different situations. Even very simple and meaningless stimuli like polygons 
and branches are sensitive to the current context. This contextually dependent 
on-line categorization seems also to be perceptually grounded. People 
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distinguish objects in the environment depending on their perceptual similarity 
even without an explicit task to do so. 
 
        1.3. Discussion of the empirical data and conclusion  
 
This section attempted to reveal the controversies and weak points in 
the field of relative judgment. The major problem, in my opinion, is the 
absence of unambiguous answer about the causes of contextual effects in 
judgment. Is there one particular factor that produces contrast and assimilation 
under specific circumstances or, probably, there are several different factors 
that contribute to the contextual effects? It is also possible that these factors 
compete with each other and the outcome becomes not easily predictable. 
Stimulus presentation mode is an appropriate example of the first idea 
(variations of the same factor results in both contextual effects): successive 
presentation of the contextual and target stimulus result in contrast, while 
simultaneous one – in assimilation (Geiselman, Haight, and Kimata, 1984). 
This idea, however, is not evident from the empirical review. For example, 
Sherif, Taub and Holland (1958) demonstrated both effects through the same 
procedure and within a single experiment. The only variable that they varied 
was the place of the anchor bur not the procedure for anchor presentation. 
Other experiments that contradict the same hypothesis, namely that the 
presentation of the stimuli may cause a particular contextual effect, are the 
experiments on expectation driven assimilation (Manis and Paskewitz, 1984; 
Manis at all, 1988) and multiattribute judgments (Melers and Birnbaum, 
1882). 
Another example of the idea that variations of the same factor may 
result in both contrast and assimilation is the hypothesis that category 
membership of contextual and target stimulus is crucial for the subsequent 
context effect (Sherif et al., 1958; Strack et al., 1985). Contrast may result 
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from the presentation of a context that does not belong to the category to 
which the target stimuli are assigned. Assimilation, on the other hand, may 
result from the presentation of a context that belongs to the target category if 
the context does not change the frequency of the stimulus distribution. 
Moreover, the categorization can be considered an on-line context-dependent 
process (Goldstone, 1995). Experimental data that seems to contradict to 
category membership hypothesis come from the experiments on contrast 
effect that rely on frequency of the stimulus distribution (e.g., Parducci and 
Perrett, 1971, Wedel et al, 1987). Although, stimuli that provoke contrastive 
shift in judgment belong to the same category as the target one they push the 
ratings of the target away from them if they are densely packed. Other 
contradicting experiments are the ones that require judgment of ambiguous 
stimuli. It seems that people are more susceptible to assimilate their ratings of 
an ambiguous target towards the available context (Srull and Wyer, 1979; 
Herr et al., 1983; Wyer, 1974; Anderson, 1966, 1971b).  
 The most “popular” and implicitly shared idea in the field seems to be 
that the two contextual effects are caused by different factors. Some 
researchers explore the causes for contrast (e.g., Parducci and Perret, 1971; 
Arieh and Marks, 2002; Mellers and Birnbaum, 1981; Wedell et al., 1987), 
others – for assimilation (e.g., Anderson, 1966, 1971b; Wyer, 1974; Srull and 
Wyer, 1979; Manis and Paskewitz, 1984). Moreover, research on contrast has 
been typically performed with simple rather than complex stimuli and vise 
versa, most research on assimilation effect has been performed with complex 
rather than simple stimuli.  
The situation, of course, may be even more complex if we consider the 
evidence for low-level contrast (Arieh and Marks, 2002; Goldstone, 1995) and 
low-level assimilation (Goldstone, 1995). Context, however, may influence 
information processing at different levels (for a review, Wedell, 1994). 
Unfortunately, the question about the level of appearance of contextual effects 
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is a relatively new one. Most of the studies that reviewed empirical evidence 
for contrast and assimilation do not differentiate where the effect appeared.  
Finally, review of the experimental data on judgment evidently showed 
that there is no terminological agreement on the stimuli used in the 
experiments for studying contrast and assimilation. On one hand, context was 
not consistently specified across studies and on the other hand, stimuli that 
differ in ambiguity and complexity were judged.   Moreover, there is no 
methodological clarity in the obtained contextual effects. Contrast and 
assimilation were demonstrated with various methodologies, e.g. different 
types of primes such as category priming, anchoring, variation of the 
instructions. Thus, the stability of the obtained contextual effects seems to be 
questionable. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theories of Judgment 
 
Current theories rarely refer to mechanisms. The theories can roughly 
be divided into two camps: psychophysical and social. The first one focuses 
on the product of judgment rather than on the process itself. The strength, 
however, is in its precise methodology for testing models, and especially in 
the use of simple stimuli for studying judgment. Simple stimuli have an 
advantage over complex ones in giving researchers the chance of knowing 
what actually people judge.  Complex stimuli (e.g., faces, personalities), on 
the contrary, may posses an innumerable number of features. Moreover, some 
features may form a new and meaningful entity within the stimulus itself. 
Theories that focus on explaining judgment of such complex and often 
ambiguous stimuli are the social ones. They have the advantage of proposing 
mechanisms for explaining contextual effects in judgment.  These two distinct 
points of view are brought together because of several reasons:  
- First, it is more efficient to find and formulate mechanisms that are 
simple enough, but explain many phenomena of interest. Moreover, it is quite 
possible that the mechanisms underlying judgment of simple and complex 
stimuli to be the same. 
- Second, there is no evidence that the contextual effects in judgment of 
simple and complex stimuli are governed by essentially different processes. 
- Third, several experiments demonstrate the existence of contrast effect 
due to change in range and/or frequency of the stimulus set which holds both 
in psychophysical and social judgments. For example, contrast was observed 
in judgment of the size of squares (Parducci and Perrett, 1971; Sarris and 
Parducci, 1978), darkness of dot-patterns (Mellers and Birnbaum, 1982), 
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physical attractiveness (Wedell et al., 1987), clinical judgments (Wedell et al., 
1990) and judgments of the self and others (Biernat et al., 1997).  
Thus, since various approaches and methodologies have obtained the 
same contrast effect, it would be possible to assume that the same mechanisms 
may govern the judgment process. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, 
there are no experimental results that differentiate judgment mechanisms 
based on level of complexity of the stimuli. 
The next section reviews the tree most relevant to the aims of the 
present research psychophysical theories for judgment. 
 
2.1. Psychophysical point of view 
Tree theories for judgment of simple stimuli are briefly reviewed in this 
section. The first two of them are focused more on describing the product of 
judgment than the process itself, while the third theory proposes particular 
mechanisms that may underlie judgment.  
• Adaptation-Level (AL) Theory 
• Range-Frequency Theory 
• ANCHOR Model 
 
• Adaptation-Level Theory 
The Adaptation-Level (AL) theory elaborated on the analysis of size-
contrast illusions (Helson, 1964). It states that judgment (J) of a test stimulus 
(X) depends on the ratio of X to the adaptation level (A). 
J (X)=X/A                        (1) 
Consider a situation of judgment of the length of line X. If the longer 
line Y is presented along with the target X, the A will shift toward the value of 
the contextual line Y (i.e., A will become higher at this particular example).  
Thus, if you consider equation (1), judgment of line X will decrease. This is a 
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typical explanation from the AL theory. It predicts always contrast from the 
context presented during judgment. 
Contradictory to the AL Theory explanation were the results of 
Parducci and Perrett (1971). In their experiment judgment of stimuli from sets 
with the same mean shifted depending on the range of the stimulus set.  
In sum, AL Theory describes judgment in the presence of external 
contextual stimulus, i.e. stimulus from the surrounding environment. It 
predicts always contrast. Restle (1978), however, argued that after 
modifications of theory’s equations AL Theory could account also for 
assimilation. Unfortunately, AL Theory did not focus on the mechanisms 
underlying contextual effects. The equations, which the theory propose 
describe the product rather than the process of judgment. 
 
• Range-Frequency Theory 
Range-Frequency Theory proposed by Parducci  (1965, 1968, and 
1974) assumes that judgments are determined by range and frequency 
principles. Each rating results from a compromise between the two principles. 
According to the range principle (R), the judge assigns the two extreme 
categories to the two extreme stimuli and then divides his psychological range 
into sub-ranges whose relative sizes are independent of the stimulus condition. 
The frequency principle (Fr) asserts that the judge employs the alternative 
categories at equal frequency. R and Fr are characteristics of the so-called 
comparison set. Whenever the comparison set is known the judgment of the 
target stimulus could be predicted. 
Suppose that the task is to judge the length of lines on a 7-point scale. 
The range value of the stimulus depends on: (a) the subjective value of the 
target stimulus; (b) the value of the smallest line presented to the subject 
before the target line; (c) the longest line presented to the subject before the 
target line.  
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Parducci proposed that the standardized range value could be calculated 
on the base of the following equation:  
Ri = (Ei-Emin)/(Emax-Emin), 
where Ei is the subjective value of the stimulus, Emin is the minimum 
value of the observed set of stimuli and Emax is the observed maximum among 
the values of the stimulus set. Ri is a number between 0 and 1. If the judgment 
has to be situated on a scale from a to b, Ri has to be rescaled with respect to 
the two extremes of the required scale: 
Ri '=a+ (b-1) Ri, 
where a is the lower end of the scale on which the stimulus has to be 
judged (i.e., 1 on a 7-point scale) and b represents the upper end of the scale 
(i.e., 7 on a 7-point scale), and Ri ' – a rescaled value of the stimulus range 
(Ri). 
The frequency value of a certain stimulus, on the other hand, represents 
the mean rating that a given stimulus would elicit if each of the rating 
categories were used with equal frequency. It could be calculated through the 
following equation: 
 Fi = (ri -1)(N-1),  
where ri  is the rank of the stimulus within the stimulus distribution and 
N is the total number of stimulus presentations. Fi is a number between 0 and 
1. It has to be rescaled with respect to the scale on which the judgment of the 
stimuli has to be done: 
Fi '=a+(b-1) x Fi , 
where a and b are the two extremes of the judgment scale. For example, 
if the stimuli have to be judged on a 7-point scale, a and b would be 
respectively, 1 and 7. 
Approximating to a whole number, the frequency value could be 
calculated if the total number of stimuli presentations is divided into the 
number of available categories. For example if the subjects in our hypothetical 
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experiment were presented 112 times with some target lines, then we could 
find the frequency value if first divide 112 to the 7 scale categories, gets 16 
and then count by rank. The frequency value of the first 16 stimuli would be 1, 
for the next 16 - 2, etc.  
Finally, judgment is accomplished according to the following formula: 
           Ji =(Ri'+Fi' ) /2 
Where Ji is the subjective judgment of the i-th stimulus, Ri' is the judged 
stimulus location in the range of stimulus values, and Fi' is the frequency value 
of the stimulus in the distribution of stimulus values. 
Later Range-Frequency Theory was further elaborated to account for 
transfer effects of changing the distribution of the comparison set (Parducci 
and Wedell, 1986). It was assumed that the comparison set includes the most 
recent (e.g., last 15) trials.  
In general, the result of the compromise between these two principles is 
in the direction of contrast. In other words, when contextual stimulus is added 
beyond the lower or the upper end of the stimulus distribution, the ends of the 
stimulus set change and the ratings of the target stimuli will increase or 
respectively decrease. Alternatively, when there is a change in the frequency 
of the stimuli in any part of the range, the result is again a contrast effect.  
Range-Frequency Theory has provided a good quantitative fits to 
judgments of simple stimuli (e.g., Parducci and Perrett, 1971; Sarris and 
Parducci, 1978), multiattribute judgments (e.g., Mellers and Birnbaum, 1981, 
1982; Cooke and Mellers, 1998; Mellers and Cooke, 1994) and judgments of 
complex stimuli (e.g., Weddel et al., 1987, 1990). 
Unfortunately, Range-Frequency Theory did not focus on the 
mechanisms that may underlie judgments. It is not specified neither how the 
comparison set is formed nor the mechanisms for extracting the R and the Fr 
values from the comparison set.  
 
 39
• The ANCHOR Model 
The ANCHOR Model (Petrov and Anderson, 2000, 2005) is a 
computational model of judgment based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture 
(Anderson and Lebiere, 1993). Unlike, Range-Frequency Theory, the 
ANCHOR Model proposes specific mechanisms for judgment of simple 
stimuli. ANCHOR models judgment and absolute identification (i.e., 
judgment with a feed-back) of line segments. The length of the lines was 
transformed by the model into internal magnitude, using calculations 
consistent with Weber’s low. Thus, the whole perceptual subsystem was 
reduced to a single stochastic equation that abstracts away factors like 
habituation, perceptual contrast, Gestalt etc. The obtained magnitude of the 
stimulus was compared to a set of anchors (prototypes for each scale category) 
kept in the Long Term Memory (LTM). The best fitting anchor (the most 
active one) became a reference point for further comparisons that result in the 
final judgment produced by the model. Anchor selection is a probabilistic 
process, sensitive to similarity between the internalized stimulus magnitude, 
base-level activation and recency.  
Although the ANCHOR model provides a detailed description of the 
mechanisms underlying the judgment process, it has several limitations. 
Unlike, the more general Range-Frequency Theory it can process only simple 
stimuli. Moreover, the ANCHOR model was specifically tuned to generate 
answers only on a 9-point scale. Therefore, the issue for transferring judgment 
from one scale to another and how a 100-point scale could be represented in 
LTM via a set of anchors remains open. 
 
• Conclusion 
To conclude, the theories presented in this section seem to share the 
assumption that target stimuli are judged against a particular context. The 
context, however, is considered as external by the AL Theory (e.g., contextual 
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stimulus that changes A) and as internal by the Range-Frequency Theory (i.e., 
R and Fr of the comparison set) and the ANCHOR Model (i.e., anchors kept 
in LTM). Moreover, context may dynamically vary with time as the 
ANCHOR Model describes it.  
Another open issue in the field concerns the complexity of the stimuli: 
namely, whether the theories can explain the judgment of both simple and 
complex stimuli. The Range-Frequency Theory is the only theory that takes an 
effort at this direction. It could, however, be the case, that Range-Frequency 
Theory describes contextually sensitive mapping between the internal 
magnitude and the scale (Parducci, 1965), while others, e.g. AL Theory, are 
more interested in contextually sensitive perception.  
Unlike the three theories reviewed in this section, the social theories of 
judgment briefly presented in the next section focus more on the mechanisms 
than on the product of judgment. In addition, social theories unlike 
psychophysical ones more often predict assimilation than contrast. 
 
2.2. Social Cognition Theories 
The following section discusses contrast and assimilation from the point 
of view of: 
1. Two-Path Theory 
2. Integration Theory  
3. “Change in Meaning” Theory 
4. Inclusion-Exclusion Theory 
5. Norm Theory 
 
• Two-Path Theory  
Two-Path Theory is a judgment model proposed by Manis and 
Paskewitz (1984). They assume that context exerts both assimilative and 
contrastive forces upon human judgment. Context violates judgment through 
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these two independent paths. On one hand, prior exposure to some category 
members increases the expectation to encounter another one of the same kind. 
This bias is called assimilation. For example, participants who were initially 
presented with relatively tall women (in the induction series) then rated the 
tall women in the test sample as being taller than the respondents who initially 
assessed short women (Manis, Biernat and Nelson, 1991). Similar results were 
found when participants judge the degree of psychopathology of patients 
(Manis and Paskewitz, 1984; Manis et al., 1988) and judgments of self and 
others (Biernat, Manis, Kobrynovicz, 1997). Manis and Paskewitz (1984) link 
expectation with judgment through a Bayesian-like information processing. 
Assimilation was explained through some sort of readiness of the cognitive 
system to encounter exemplars that concur with the base-rate expectations. 
On the other hand, contrast is provoked by the comparison between the 
stimulus that has to be judged and the stimuli that have been recently judged. 
Let us consider a case in which respondents were asked to judge the height of 
a short female and a medium-height male and then to rate the height of target 
women and men in the test phase. These subjects perceived the female target 
as taller in comparison with judgments that followed tall female in the 
induction phase (Manis, Biernat and Nelson, 1991).  The authors assume the 
Range-Frequency Theory explanation for contrast effects in judgment.  
The final judgment according to the Two-Path Theory is a result from 
contrast due to the R and Fr principles and the expectation-driven 
assimilation.   
An advantage of the Two-Path Theory is that it tries to explain both 
contrast and assimilation. The theory, however, did not reach detailed 
explanation of the mechanisms underlying both expectation-driven 
assimilation and contrast effects.  
 
• Integration Theory 
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The Integration theory of Anderson (1971a) states that whenever the 
stimulus is presented within a context it's rating would shifts toward the 
contextual value. 
s`= ws + (1-w) I, 
where s` is the value of a stimulus in the given context, s is its value 
without context,  I is the overall impression (the subjective impression of the 
stimulus and its context together), and w is a weighting factor. The context 
may change either the weighted average (because of the “I” parameter) or the 
importance of some stimulus (w). As a result, however, always, assimilation 
may appear. 
The assimilation due to an averaging of the response is demonstrated 
mainly in the domain of impression-formation (Anderson, 1965; Anderson, 
1966; Anderson, 1971a; Anderson, 1971b; Anderson, Lindner and Lopes, 
1973; Wyer, 1974).  
Change in the w-parameter (the importance of a particular component) 
was demonstrated in situations in which respondents judge the leader of a 
group. The assessment of the group as a whole is directly connected with the 
evaluation of the leader (Anderson et al., 1973). When the leader is a very 
attractive person, attractiveness of the whole group is judged higher than the 
attractiveness of the same group but presented with a less attractive leader.  
The Integration Theory has one problem on the experimental level. Ss 
were always told that the stimuli belong to the same entity - one person, one 
group etc. It is quite probable that not the context but rather the instruction 
influences judgment. It would be much more convincing the same results 
(assimilation effect) to be found without such instruction manipulations.  
Unlike Integration Theory, the theory ("Change in Meaning" Theory) 
reviewed in the next section locates contextual effects in judgment on the 
encoding rather than integration of the information. However, the two theories 
possess different points of view about the nature of the stimuli. The 
 43
Integration Theory accepts that the meaning of the stimuli is context free 
while the "Change in Meaning" approach - that it has a variety of 
interpretations. In addition, Wyer (1974) found that when judges are asked to 
evaluate an adjective that describes a particular person, presented in a group of 
another two adjectives  (adjectives that represents the other two persons), the 
“halo effect” explanation fits better to the results. In comparison, in a situation 
in which subjects have to assess one person through three adjectives, the 
Change in Meaning approach is more adequate (Wyer, 1974). 
 
• “Change of Meaning” Model 
Change in Meaning model (Wyer, 1974; Srull and Wyer, 1979, Srull 
and Wyer, 1980) accounts for "how" the ambiguity of the target stimuli 
contributes to the appearance of the assimilation effect. According to the 
Change in Meaning theory, the meaning of the stimuli tends to be consistent 
with the meaning of the most accessible and applicable category in a 
particular instance of time. In the Change in Meaning approach the focus is 
mainly on the questions “when” and “how” context affects human judgment. 
Several experiments demonstrate that ambiguity of the stimulus has an 
important role for the assimilation to occur. What is more, the strength of the 
contextual effects increases with the ambiguity of the test stimuli (Wyer, 
1974; Srull and Wyer, 1979; Srull and Wyer, 1980). Herr et al., (1982) 
however, demonstrated that the extremity of the context also may matter. 
Ambiguous stimuli primed with moderately extreme exemplars assimilated 
their meaning to the primes, while the same ambiguous stimuli could be 
judged in contrast of the extreme contextual prime. 
With respect to the question concerning the time of contextual influence 
in judgment, Srull and Wyer (1980) demonstrated that the delay between 
category activation and acquisition of the target stimulus   may decrease 
assimilation. As the delay between category activation (the context-usually a 
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certain trait category) and the acquisition of the stimulus information (an 
ambiguous behavior with respect to the primed category) gets longer (none, 
24 hr., 1 week), the assimilation decreases but never occurs if the trait 
category is presented after the target information (Srull and Wyer, 1980). 
Those results suggest that context exerts its effect on the way in which 
information is encoded.  
Stapel, Koomen and Plight (1996) also demonstrated that characteristics 
of the context could be important for the subsequent contrast or assimilation in 
judgment of ambiguous stimuli. Participants were exposed to the photos of the 
actors with real names of some trait implying sentences like: "Peter peddled 
even harder as he fell further behind in the race" (persistent); John knew he 
could handle most problems that would come up" (confident) and so on.  The 
subsequent evaluations of the Donald's ambiguous behavior (with respect to 
the trait dimensions implied by the first part of the experiment) along the two 
applicable dimensions2 on 7-point scales shifted away from the primed 
examples. Participants rated Donald as more conceited and stubborn rather 
then persistent and respectively confident. On the contrary, when the primed 
concept was general behavior labels (abstract concept), the judgment of the 
target behavior assimilates to the primed one. Furthermore, it turns out that 
descriptive applicability of the primed category is not so important 
precondition for occurrence of contextual effect. The activation of a 
sufficiently broad and inapplicable construct (e.g. good) may prime a 
descriptively applicable trait (e.g. persistent) and hence, produce assimilation 
of the ambiguous target (e.g. persistent - stubborn Donald) (Stapel and 
Koomen, 2000). In other words, general (abstract) labels are more likely to 
propose an interpretative framework for an ambiguous and new target than 
narrow and specific categories. Priming with narrow and specific constructs, 
on the other hand, will result in contrast effects, because they represent 
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sufficiently distinct and relevant information, which is more likely to serve as 
a subjective standard for comparison in the subsequent judgment. 
In conclusion, “Change in Meaning” Theory focuses on the 
mechanisms underlying judgment of ambiguous stimuli. The theory suggests 
that judgment is performed within the context of the most active information. 
Depending on whether the accessible information is general or specific, 
assimilation or contrast, respectively, may appear. The mechanisms suggested 
by the “Change in Meaning Theory” are a kind of categorization as far as 
judged stimuli within this paradigm are mostly ambiguous ones. 
The next theory also treats categorization as a source of contextual 
effects in judgment. Unlike, “Change in Meaning” Theory, however, 
Inclusion-Exclusion Theory describes both contrast and assimilation in 
judgment of complex stimuli.  
 
• Inclusion-Exclusion Theory 
According to the inclusion-exclusion theory (Schwarz and Bless, 1991), 
the default operation is to include information that comes to mind in the 
representation of the target. If this happens, assimilation would occur. On the 
contrary, if the accessible information is excluded from the representation of 
the target, a contrast is more likely to appear. The factors that determine which 
information would be included or excluded concern the source (Does the 
information comes to mind for a wrong reason?), categorization of the most 
accessible information at a given time (Does the information belong to the 
target category?), and conversational norms for its use (Am I supposed to use 
it?).  
If the judge knows that some irrelevant factors brought to his/her mind 
certain information, he/she would exclude it from the representation of the 
target and hence a contrast would appear. When, however, individuals’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                
2 Confident-conceited and persistent-stubborn 
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cognitive capacity is restricted (participants work on another task or are 
unmotivated), the opposite assimilation effect occurs (Martin et al., 1990). On 
the contrary, when a person is not aware why a certain category is highly 
active, he/she would include it in the target’s relevant information by default. 
Salience of the category boundaries is also among the possible factors 
that may produce contrast or assimilation effects. Schwarz and Bless (1991) 
altered the temporally salient boundaries of the target. They asked first-year 
students to assess their current life-satisfaction after recalling a positive or a 
negative event from the last two years. Subjects reported higher life-
satisfaction when the recall of the positive event preceded the judgment than 
when a negative recall was first. However, if the instruction pointed that they 
were not at college two years ago, the result was reversed. Subjects, who 
recalled a negative event excluded it from the college period and rated their 
current life-satisfaction higher than those that recalled a positive one. 
A category width is another variable that determines the use of the 
accessible information. Wider target categories allow much more information 
to be included than the narrow ones. For example, if the task is to assess the 
trustworthiness of politicians in the United States, the target category includes 
all the politicians in the United States and one can include any politician from 
the same country in this category. However, if the question concerns the 
trustworthiness of the politicians of the Democratic Party, you could include 
only the Democrats etc.  
Conversational norms may also affect judgment. People tend to make 
their conversations informative and for that reason, they usually avoid 
providing information that is already “given” (given-new contract). That is 
why, when unhappily married respondents judged their life-satisfaction, they 
rated it lower if they were asked to rate their general life-satisfaction before 
that (Schwarz and Strack, 1991). 
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To conclude, Inclusion-exclusion Theory explains both contrast and 
assimilation depending on some constructive process of on-line building of 
the representation of the target stimulus. These mechanisms, however, were 
specified on a quite abstract level of description. Much more detailed, in this 
respect, seem to be the attempt of the Norm Theory reviewed in the next 
section to describe the process of judgment. 
 
• Norm Theory 
The Norm Theory proposed by Kahneman and Miller (1986) can hardly 
be classified as belonging to the social cognition approach or as a theory for 
judgment. It is a theory that deals with constructing norms for categories. The 
authors applied the theory to some complex social phenomena as emotional 
responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes.  Although, the 
Norm Theory does not explain the whole process of judgment - from the 
stimulus to the rating assigned to it, the theory proposes some plausible 
mechanisms that underlie the process of judgment of both simple and complex 
stimuli. 
The Norm Theory states that a stimulus including its context and its 
category name evokes a set of memory representations of objects, events or 
fragments of them. A probe activates simultaneously and to a different degree 
a number of elements that could be both retrieved and constructed. Each 
element could be characterized in terms of features (values of attributes). The 
evoked set could be described in terms of norms for each of the attributes. For 
example, if the set could be defined as having attributes X and Y, each feature 
of every element is described along them through a particular distribution of 
activation (profile). The sum of the profiles of the elements for X and Y 
constructs the attributes’ norms for the whole set. As Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) pointed out, these aggregate profiles provide a measure of availability, 
while the measure of normality could be received through rescaling the 
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profiles according to the ratio of their availability to the maximum of the 
mode. Evaluation of the stimulus normality is based on the comparison with 
the evoked norms. 
The Norm Theory proposes a general frame for explanation of 
judgment as well as some references to possible mechanisms and structures 
(e.g., "spreading associative activation", "exemplar models", "norm 
construction") but the theory does not specify the connections among them. 
Still, it predicts that each particular stimulus would be compared with a 
particular norm, which was constructed depending on the elements that the 
stimulus retrieved from the memory.  
The Norm theory does not specify neither the mechanisms, which 
underlie the comparison between the probe (stimulus and its context) and the 
norm nor the process of assigning a particular rating to a particular target 
stimulus. It also does not explain in details the contextual effects in judgment 
that we are interested in. However, the theory could explain contextual effects 
in judgment as result from stimulus comparison with a contextually sensitive 
norm. 
 
• Conclusion 
Social Theories outline two important starting points for further 
discussions. One of them concerns the ambiguity of the stimulus and 
contextual category, the other – the level of appearance of contextual effects. 
The type of the stimulus or context seems to be crucial for contextual effects. 
In social judgment, assimilation is usually demonstrated with ambiguous 
stimuli or wide contextual categories, while contrast – with unambiguous 
stimuli. This distinction, however, is not very precise because assimilation 
effects were also demonstrated with simple and unambiguous stimuli in the 
field of psychophysical judgments (see section for sequential assimilation in 
Chapter 1).  
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The time of contextual influence, i.e. during the encoding or during the 
integration of information, was also in the focus of social theories. The task 
(judgment of a group member / trait of a particular person), however, was 
shown to be able to switch the level of contextual influence on judgment 
(Wyer, 1974).  
In sum, Social Theories explain contextual effects by referring to 
memory – both memory processes (e.g. encoding, integration, retrieval, 
accessibility and applicability of the active categories) and its content (e.g., 
broad or narrow categories).  
Although social theories were interested in the mechanisms underlying 
contextually sensitive judgment, they did not specify them in details. Only the 
Norm Theory suggests some possible mechanisms for explaining the way 
stimulus elicits its set for comparison and represents it with a single norm, like 
- spreading associative activation, norm construction etc. Since the Norm 
Theory is not a theory explicitly designed for judgment it does not specify the 
direction of contextual shift depending on the norm. 
 
2.3. Theories of Judgment - Conclusion 
To sum up, it seems that psychophysical theories focused more on 
contrast, while social cognition ones – on assimilation effect in judgment. 
Although the main difference between these two approaches concerns the 
complexity of the judged stimuli, there are examples of theories that 
successfully account for judgment of both simple and complex stimuli, e.g. 
the Range-Frequency Model. Thus, stimulus complexity may not be so crucial 
for distinguishing two different approaches to judgment. 
Psychophysical and Social Theories are, however, interested in different 
aspects of judgment. Psychophysical theories describe the outcome of the 
judgment usually by the means of equations. Social theories focus more on the 
process of judgment and on the possible mechanisms underlying contextual 
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influence in judgment. The proposed mechanisms, however, were specified at 
a quite general level, e.g. expectation-driven assimilation (Manis and 
Paskewitz, 1984), activation of particular information (e.g. Srull and Wyer, 
1979, 1980; Stapel et al., 1996), inclusion or exclusion of the target stimulus 
from the contextual information (Schwarz and Bless, 1991). In contrast to 
most theories in the field, the ANCHOR Model (Petrov and Anderson, 2000, 
2005) and the Norm Theory (Kahneman and Miller, 1986) describe in more 
details the mechanisms of contextually sensitive judgment. Unfortunately, the 
ANCHOR Model is very restricted in several aspects, i.e. it focuses only on 
judgment of simple stimuli on a 9-point scale. Norm Theory, on the other, 
hand is more general but describes only contextually sensitive construction of 
the norm. The way this norm may shift judgment was not defined, neither as 
direction nor as mechanisms.  
In general, the mechanisms indicated in the theoretical review (this 
chapter) seem to rely strongly on memory, e.g.. anchors were kept in memory, 
norms were constructed from recalled exemplars, category information was 
activated from particular context. Therefore, the mechanism specified in more 
details in the field of judgment seems to be connected in one way or another to 
memory. It could be, however, that context also influences judgment by 
changing perceptual input as Arieh and Marks (2002) argued. Goldstone 
(1995) also discusses the possibility context effects to result from perceptually 
grounded on-line categorization of judged stimuli. Unfortunately, theories 
explaining the contextual shifts of perceptual input in terms of detailed 
mechanisms have not yet been proposed.   
In addition, both psychophysical and social theories seem to have the 
same terminological disagreement about the character of context, i.e., whether 
context is external or internal one. One part of the theories define context, as 
external one, i.e. stimulus presented at the environment during judgment (e.g., 
Helson, 1964; Anderson, 1966, 1971b). Second part, seems to share the idea 
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that context is internal, i.e. information retrieved from memory (e.g., Petrov 
and Anderson, 2000, 2005; Manis and Paskewitz, 1984; Wyer, 1974; Srull and 
Wyer, 1980; Schwarz and Bless, 1991). A third part, defines context as 
possessing both external and internal aspects, i.e. context from the 
environment (e.g. other stimuli and all characteristics of the target stimulus) 
directs memory retrieval, which elicits the attributes that comprise the 
constructed norm (Kahneman and Miller, 1986). In the next chapter, the 
JUDGEMAP-1 (Judgment as mapping) Model will be reviewed. It defines 
context in a similar way to the Norm Theory, i.e., context as comprising both 
stimuli from the environment and exemplars retrieved from memory. Since 
JADGEMAP1 is a computational model, it proposes detailed mechanisms for 
contrast and assimilation effects in judgment. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
JUDGEMAP-1 
The empirical and theoretical review outlined several important 
weaknesses and open issues for further development in the domain of 
judgments. First, any theory of contextual effects in judgments needs a 
starting definition of context. This would certainly allow a generalization of 
the empirical and theoretical findings, and new tests for the proposed theory.  
Second, both the theories and the experimental results do not define the 
factors responsible for contextual effects in judgment. It is difficult to predict 
when contrast or assimilation would appear in a particular judgment situation. 
This seems to be the greatest problem in the field, because it poses doubts on 
the systematic nature of contextual effects. A profitable step to overcome the 
current state of affairs may be an explanation of contextual influences in terms 
of the cognitive mechanisms that cause them. Moreover, if the mechanisms 
underlying judgment are shared with other cognitive processes and can still 
produce assimilation and contrast, they can possibly explain also other 
contextual effects related to other cognitive processes. This will also allow 
contextually sensitive judgment to be integrated with other cognitive abilities. 
JUDGEMAP-1 (Kokinov, Hristova, Petkov, 2004), for example, integrates 
judgment with analogy-making and memory within the cognitive architecture 
DUAL (Kokinov, 1994a, 1994b).  
Unlike, most theories in the field of judgment, JUDGEMAP-1 starts 
from an explicit definition of context and suggests detailed mechanisms for 
judgment of both simple and complex stimuli. JUDGEMAP-1 treats context 
as equivalent to the content of the WM. Thus, context may comprise both 
perceived elements from the surrounding environment and old instances 
recalled from LTM. Thus, it brings together the points of view of different 
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researchers viewing context as external or internal. In this respect, WM seems 
to be a good substitute for the notion of context proposed by the Dynamic 
Theory of Context (Kokinov, 1995), namely that context could be considered 
as a “state of the mind” with no clear cut boundaries that dynamically vary in 
the course of time and comprise all associative relevant elements in memory.  
Since, JUDGEMAP-1 is a computational model it proposes concrete 
mechanisms describing the process of judgment. It is naturally integrated with 
AMBR (Associative Memory-Based Reasoning) Model (Kokinov, 1998; 
Kokinov and Petrov, 2001) within the cognitive architecture DUAL (Kokinov, 
1994b, 1994c). Both Models rely on memory (for constructing a dynamic set 
of entities in WM) and both use the same mechanisms of mapping.  
This chapter consists of several sections. First the DUAL architecture 
will be briefly presented, than the JUDGEMAP-1 Model and finally a specific 
prediction of the JUDGEMAP-1 Model. 
 
3.1. DUAL Cognitive Architecture 
The JUDGEMAP-1 Model is based on the mechanisms proposed by the 
cognitive architecture DUAL (Kokinov, 1994a; 1994b). Knowledge 
representation and information processing in DUAL are carried out by small 
entities called DUAL agents. Each Dual agent is a hybrid entity that has 
symbolic and connectionist aspects. On the symbolic side, each agent "stands 
for" something and is able to perform certain simple manipulations on 
symbols. On the connectionist side, it sends activation to and receives 
activation from its immediate neighbors. Each DUAL-based system consists 
of a large number of such agents. There is no central executor in the 
architecture that controls its global operation. Instead, each individual agent is 
relatively simple and has access only to local information, interacting with a 
few neighboring agents. The overall behavior of the system emerges out of the 
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collective activity of the whole population. This so-called "society of mind" 
(Minsky, 1985) provides a substrate for concurrent processing, interaction and 
emergent computation. Only a small fraction of this large network (LTM), 
however, may be active at any particular moment. The active subset of long-
term memory together with some temporally constructed agents constitute the 
WM of the architecture. The mechanism of spreading activation plays a key 
role for controling the size and the content of the WM. There is a treshold  that 
sets the minimum level of activation an agent must have in order to enter the 
WM. There is also a spontaneous decay factor that pushes the activation level 
back to zero. As the pattern of activation changes over time, some agents from 
WM fall back to dormancy, others are activated, etc. Only active agents may 
perform symbolic computation. Moreover, the speed of these computations 
depends on the level of activation of the respective agent. 
The activation in DUAL is supplied from two constant sorces: Input and 
Goal nodes. The Input node simulates perceptual input, while the Goal node 
represents the presure to the system to perform a particulat task. Local 
computations and spreading activation, which determines the relevance of the 
various pieces of knowledge, make DUAL a dynamic and context-sensitive 
model. 
 
3.2. JUDGEMAP-1 
JUDGEMAP-1 views the process of judgment as an analogical 
mapping between a set of stimuli and a set of ratings (i.e. a mapping that will 
keep the ordering relations of the sets – better stimuli should receive higher 
ratings). The set of stimuli (called comparison set) includes the target stimulus 
and possibly some recently judged stimuli, some familiar exemplars of the 
judged category and some similar to the target, previously encountered 
stimuli. The set of ratings represents the scale defined by the particular task. 
As a rule, the stimuli in the first set can vary with time (i.e. the comparison set 
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is dynamic) – some receive additional activation and enter the set, others, on 
the contrary, lose activation and fade away. Usually all (or most) of the stimuli 
in the comparison receive ratings but, as far as the task is to judge the target 
one, only its rating is reported. The content of the set of ratings is constant, 
because the task requires that (judgment on a particular scale). Nevertheless, 
some of the ratings can be more active than the others (e.g. favourite numbers 
or the ratings recently used in previous judgments). The correspondence 
between the set of stimuli and the scale values could be a partial one but the 
pressure, which is important for the analogical mapping between the set of 
objects and the set of ratings, is that objects and relations between them have 
to be similar3. In the framework of judgment, the objects are the stimuli and 
the ratings, while the relations represent the order of the stimuli with respect 
to the judged characteristic and respectively, the order of the numbers in the 
scale. The memorized objects from the comparison set and the rating from the 
set of the ratings would send markers to a common node, called "element of 
scale". When markers emitted from the object and the rating cross in this 
common node, a hypothesis for correspondence is constructed. The activations 
of the rating, and of the object determine the strength of their connections with 
the hypothesis and hence its level of activation. Hypotheses that are more 
active have a bigger chance to win.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3  JUDGMAP-1 is highly restricted in the application of analogical mapping. It is based on 
calculations of the relative position of both the object and the rating on their min-to-max 
scale and generation of hypotheses about correspondence between objects and ratings with 
similar relative position. The next version of the model – JUDGEMAP-2 has already more 
sophisticated mechanisms for computing and representing the ordering relations in each of 
the sets and mapping these ordering relations rather than the objects and ratings directly. 
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 Such hypotheses of correspondence are constructed between most of the 
elements of the comparison set and the ratings. In this way, a constrain-
satisfaction network is established. It is possible, a single stimulus to be linked 
to several hypothesis representing possible correspondences with several 
different ratings. Then the hypotheses that connect the same object with 
several different ratings will be competing and between them inhibitory links 
will be established. Similarly, if a single rating corresponds to two or more 
objects these hypotheses will also be competing and therefore connected with 
inhibitory links. On the other hand, the links between supporting each other 
hypotheses are exhibitory. Each agent (a rating or a object) checks the 
activation of the hypotheses that are connected to it. If one of them holds as a 
leader for a long time, it is promoted to become a winner. The result of the 
constraint-satisfaction network determines the correspondence between the 
objects (including the target stimulus) and the ratings.  
Since JUDGEMAP-1 is a DUAL–based model of judgment it adopts 
mechanisms from the DUAL architecture. The activation from the GOAL and 
the INPUT nodes spreads through the neighbouring nodes and combined with 
the residual activation of ratings and stimuli (if activated from a previous task) 
determine the content of the WM (Diagram1). If the task is to judge the length 
of lines, the WM will consists of a number of agents: the representation of the 
target (activated by the INPUT node), the concepts of line and length of lines 
(activated by the INPUT node as well), and as a consequence some typical 
examples of lines seen before (for example, line10), examples of lines similar 
to the target one (activated by the target stimuli via the mechanism of 
spreading activation, for example, line7) and recently seen examples of lines, 
which still have some residual activation (for example, line56). 
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Diagram1. Activation spreading from the INPUT node in the Dual-
based model of judgment. The content of the comparison set is formed. 
 The GOAL node, on the other hand, will activate the target’s 
representation, the concept for length of lines and the scale representation that 
is required (Diagram 2). 
INPUT 
Target 
line 
(line6) 
line10 
line 
length of 
line 
line7 
line56 
 
Diagram 2. Activation from the GOAL node in the DUAL-based model of 
judgment. 
 
GOAL 
scale 1-7 
Target 
line 
(line6) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 1 
length 
of line 
Examples of lines that were activated somehow from the input send 
markers to the node value of length and receive the temporal values of the 
range (minimum and maximum). Each node calculates its own relative value 
(rv=(value-min)/(min-max)) and sends a marker to the agent called “a value of 
length” (Diagram3).  
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Diagram3. The set of stimuli (the target stimulus and the retrieved stimuli) before 
each agent to send a marker with its rv to the node "value of length". 
The nodes that belong to the set of ratings (the scale activated from the 
GOAL node) also send markers with their current relative value to the node 
called "element of scale 1-7" (suppose that the required scale is a 7-point 
scale) and receive the current min and max. Each node from the coalition of 
the ratings calculates it's current rv depending on the min and max value in a 
given moment (rv=(value-min)/(min-max) (Diagram4).  
line7 
line56 
Target 
line 
(line6) 
Value of length: 
min: nill 
max: nill 
line10 
Diagram4. The set of the ratings before each agent to send a marker with its rv to 
the node "element of scale 1-7". 
The agents "value of length" and “elements of scale 1-7” transmit the 
markers of the agents in both coalitions (the coalition of the objects and the 
coalition of the ratings) toward the node “element of scale”. When markers 
from “elements of scale 1-7” and “value of length” intersect in the node 
“element of scale”, a hypothesis for correspondence is generated. It connects a 
2 3 4 5 6 7 1 
Element of scale 1-7: 
min: nill 
max: nill 
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particular agent representing a object and a particular agent representing the 
rating.  
This newborn hypothesis would receive activation from three places: 
the two nodes that correspond to each other and the node “element of scale” 
(Diagram5). The weight of the first two connections would be calculated 
based on the difference between the “rv” of the corresponding nodes (the 
smaller the difference, i.e. the relative positions of the object and of the rating 
are close to each other, the greater the weight is).  
 
Diagram5. Hypotheses of correspondence. A constraint-satisfaction network. 
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The hypothesis that receives the highest activation for a sufficiently 
long period of time will become the winner. If it happens, the particular line 
instance (the target, for example) will receive the rating to which it is 
connected by this winner hypothesis. 
Assimilation effect arises in the JUDGEMAP-1 model from 
simultaneous or residual activation of a certain rating on the scale. Recently or 
simultaneously judged stimuli (context stimuli) activate additionally the 
particular ratings that they have received and indirectly their neighboring 
ratings. Suppose that line 10 was the line that was judged in the previous trial 
and its rating was 4. Suppose then that on the next trial the target line is very 
small and should be evaluated by 1. Line10 and the rating-4 are still active. 
The node of the rating-4 would spread activation to its neighboring ratings of 
3 and 5. They would be less active than 4 but more active than 2 and 6. 
Suppose now that the target line is connected with the hypotheses of 
correspondence to the ratings 1 and 2. Since rating 2 would be more active 
than the rating 1 (being a closer neighbor of 4) this could help the hypothesis, 
which connects the target line with the rating 2 to win. Thus, an assimilation 
effect will arise – the target will receive a rating 2 instead of 1. 
Contrast effect is explained in the model by the competition between 
the hypotheses connecting one and the same rating to two or more lines. This 
competition may seem unnecessary since there shouldn’t be a problem to rate 
two different lines with the same rating, however, this competition is inherited 
in the JUDGEMAP-1 model from the AMBR model of analogy-making that 
requires a one-to-one mapping. Thus, JUDGEMAP-1 makes the pressure two 
different lines to be rated with two different ratings and therefore makes the 
pressure each rating to be used not more often than the others. As a direct 
consequence, we obtain the frequency principle of the Range-Frequency 
Theory. Now suppose that we have obtained a rating 2 for line 10 and we have 
now to rate a target whose main hypotheses are those of rating 1 and 2. Since 
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its hypothesis that it can be rated by 2 will have a competitor (the hypothesis 
that the previous line was rated also 2) this hypothesis will be inhibited by the 
competitor and is not very likely to win. Therefore, it is more probable to 
obtain a rating of 1 for this target, i.e. to obtain a contrast effect. 
 
3.3. Predictions of the Model. 
 
3.3.1. How the comparison set is formed?  
The JUDGEMAP-1 model postulates that the target stimulus would be 
included and judged within a dynamically formed set of memories for other 
objects. This set is formed by several factors such as similarity, recency and 
familiarity. All these factors contribute to the level of activation of the 
corresponding memory element in the model. Thus, recently judged objects 
would have some residual activation and therefore participate in the 
comparison set. Objects that are more familiar would have stronger links from 
various other nodes and therefore would be easier to be retrieved (activated) in 
the comparison set. Finally, objects, which are highly similar to the target, 
would have a high chance to be activated by the many shared features and 
therefore will also have greater chances to participate in the comparison set. 
The process of formation of the comparison set and the process of judgment 
run in parallel and interact with each other. Moreover, the level of activation 
of each element of the comparison set would be proportional to the level of its 
contribution to the result. Thus, if the representation of one particular object is 
highly activated (e.g., because it is very similar to the target object) then this 
object will play a more important role in the comparison set than another one. 
In other words, we may consider the comparison set as a fuzzy set where the 
degree of membership is computed as the level of activation of the 
corresponding memory element. 
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3.3.2. Idea for research on JUDGEMAP-1’s predictions 
Suppose we have multidimensional objects to be rated on a one-
dimensional scale, e.g., “Rate on a 7-point-scale how appropriate this dress is 
for an official dinner”. The model would predict that dresses similar to the 
target will be retrieved from memory and form the comparison set. These 
dresses may be similar on various dimensions that are not necessarily relevant 
for the current judgment, but the very fact of similarity may bring them into 
WM and make them to participate in the comparison set. Let now take an 
extreme example. Suppose that we have to rate “how tall this person is”. 
Again, other persons that are similar to that one will tend to form the 
comparison set. This means that if the person is a lady, predominantly images 
of other ladies will be retrieved and thus the “tallness” of ladies will be 
computed based on a different set than for men. This sounds very intuitive. It 
has, however, further implications: if the target lady is blond, predominantly 
blond ladies will be retrieved, if the target person is a teacher, predominantly 
teachers will be retrieved, etc. This is a quite unusual prediction. It says that 
even irrelevant to the task features may take part and influence the final result 
based on their contribution to the formation of the comparison set. 
The simplest case would be to study what happens if we have two-
dimensional objects that are rated along one of their dimensions and we 
manipulate the other irrelevant dimension. Let us suppose that we have to rate 
line segments that vary in length and color and we have to rate their length. In 
this case it is quite clear that the length is the relevant dimension, while the 
color is irrelevant. 
Let the target stimulus be a red line of certain length. In this case, 
according to the JUDGEMAP-1 Model, we may expect that there will be more 
red lines in the comparison set (Figure 2) – they will be activated through the 
RED concept, which is shared with the target. On the other hand, if the target 
stimulus is a green line of the same length, more green lines will become part 
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of the comparison set (Figure 3). Now, if it happens that the known red lines 
are longer than the known green lines, then the two target stimuli (differing 
only in color) will be included in different comparison sets and thus judged 
differently, i.e., green target would be judged to be longer than red target with 
the same length. 
 
 
 
T 
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(WM) 
2
1
3
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Figure 2. The target stimulus is red and therefore we expect more red exemplars 
in the comparison set. They happened to be larger in size and thus they compete 
for the upper part of the scale. In this case the target stimulus (of the same size as 
in Figure 7) will compete with them and will be mapped onto 4. 
Comparison Set 
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1 
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Figure 3. The target stimulus is green and therefore we expect more green exemplars in the 
comparison set. They happened to be smaller in size and thus they compete for the lower part 
of the scale. In this case the target stimulus (of the same size as in Figure 6) will compete with 
them and eventually will be mapped onto 5. In this way we receive an upward shift in the 
judgment. 
This prediction was verified with a simulation experiment with 
JUDGEMAP-1 that is briefly described in the next section. 
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• Simulation Experiment 
In this simulation, experiment a stimulus set of 56 lines was used. They 
are all in the long-term memory of the model. The lines differ in length and 
color. There are 7 different sizes (from 10 units of length to 34 units with 
increment of 4 units) and two different colors (red and green). Thus in each 
size group there are 8 lines. The frequency of the red (respectively green) lines 
varies across the size groups. In size group one (the shortest lines - length 10 
units) there are 7 green and 1 red line, in the second shortest group (length 14 
units) there are 6 green and 2 red lines, etc. In the largest group size (length of 
34 units) there are 7 red lines and one green line. Thus, the green lines were 
positively skewed while the red lines were negatively skewed. 
Each line is represented by a coalition of 5 agents standing for the line 
itself, for its color, for its length, and for the two relations (color_of and 
length_of). In addition there are agents representing the numbers from 0 to 8, 
but only the agents standing for 1 to 7 are instances of “scale element” (i.e., 
elements of the 7-point scale).  
On each run of the program one of these lines was connected to the 
input list simulating the perception of the target stimulus and simultaneously, 
the agent standing for “scale_from_1_to_7” was connected to the goal node 
simulating the instruction “rate the elements on a 7 point scale”. 
42 variations of the knowledge base of the system were produced 
simulating 42 different participants in the experiment. The knowledge bases 
differ mainly in the associative and instance links among the agents, thus 
although all our “artificial participants” will know the same lines and the same 
concepts, they will activate different instances in the comparison set (i.e., in 
WM). 
For each of these knowledge bases we have run two judgment trials: 
one for a red line of size 22 (middle size) and one for a green line of the same 
size. Since, the most active exemplars in WM receive their ratings on the scale 
 65
along with the target stimulus, the ratings of all judged lines within each run 
of the model was considered in the data analysis. 
 
Simulation Results 
7 line lengths averaged the data for each “participant”. The results from 
the simulations are presented in Figure 4. The mean rating of the green lines 
are in most cases slightly higher than the mean rating of the red lines with the 
same length. 
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Figure 4. Simulation data. The mean rating of each line with a certain length (1-7) and 
color (green and red) obtained from all “participants”. 
 
 
Thus the mean ratings of all red lines is 4.012, while the mean rating of 
all green lines is 4.065, which makes a difference of 0.053 which turns out to 
be almost significant tested with repeated measurements analysis (F 
(1,41)=3.917, p=0.055). The data shows that the possible size of effect of 
color is very small, but may turn out to be significant. This prediction makes 
sense: on one hand it is small enough, so that we can ignore it in everyday life 
and this explains why our intuition says that irrelevant information does not 
play a role in judgment. On the other hand, the simulation predicts that the 
irrelevant information does play a role and shifts a bit the evaluation. This 
means that under specific circumstances this shift could be larger and become 
significant. 
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The experimental question that follows from the model prediction is 
whether the color of the line would or would not matter in this judgment. By 
analogy with the simulation, the model’s prediction was tested experimentally 
with a set of green and red lines that form respectively, positively and 
negatively skewed distribution (Kokinov, Hristova, Petkov, 2004). 
 
• Psychological Experiment (Kokinov, Hristova, Petkov, 2004) 
Participants were asked to rate the length of 14 lines each presented 8 
times forming a set of 112 trials. The shorter lines were presented more often 
in green color, while the longer lines were presented more often in red color, 
thus forming respectively, positively and negatively skewed distributions of 
lines. The green and red lines were mixed and presented randomly for 
judgment on a 7-point scale. Each line was shown horizontally at the center of 
the computer screen against a gray background. 18 participants took part in 
this experiment. Since, the green and red lines were mixed together and 
forming, overall, a uniform distribution of lines (14 line lengths x 8 times), 
different ratings for the same line depending on its color would be considered 
as evidence in favor of the JUDGEMAP-1 Model. 
 
Results and discussion 
Like in the simulation, the green lines received higher ratings than the 
red lines with the same absolute length. The repeated measurements analysis 
showed that the difference (0.046) between the mean judgment of the green 
lines (4.239) and the mean judgment of the red lines (4.193) is significant (F 
(1, 17)=5.966, p=0.026). 
Surprisingly enough we obtained a difference (0.046) that is almost the 
same as the difference we obtained in the simulation (0.053). No tuning of the 
model was possible since we did not have the experimental data in advance. 
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Thus, the prediction of the JUDGEMAP-1 model was considered to be 
experimentally confirmed. 
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3.3.3. Aims of the present research 
Although, the prediction of JUDGEMAP-1 Model for the influence of 
the irrelevant to the task stimulus dimension was experimentally confirmed 
several questions remain: 
• Whether the effect of the irrelevant dimension was an accidental one, 
since we received a very small thought significant effect of color upon 
judgment of the line’s lengths? Thus replications are needed. Several 
experiments with similar design and the same experimental question were 
conducted. If all experiments demonstrate the same effect of the irrelevant 
dimension we can be positive about its existence. 
• Whether the influence of the irrelevant dimension can be increased? 
What could be the specific circumstances in which this negligible shift in 
judgment due to the irrelevant to the task dimension(s) may become larger? 
Each of the experiments reported in the thesis carefully manipulates a 
particular variable that may potentially increase the effect of the irrelevant 
stimulus dimension(s). This was considered as the main goal of the presented 
experimental work, namely, to explore the upper boundary of the effect 
produced by the irrelevant context.  
• Whether the effect of the irrelevant dimension is due to contextually 
sensitive retrieval of similar to the target stimulus exemplars (i.e. is due to the 
judgment process itself) or it is rather due to some early low-level perceptual 
changes in the stimulus representation with respect to the stimulus irrelevant 
characteristics? This question concerns the mechanisms that may underlie the 
reported effect of the irrelevant dimension, namely whether spreading 
activation mechanism (Kokinov, et al., 2004) may account for the presented 
results or rather the results could be described by means of early 
“recalibration” of perceptual system’s sensitivity (Marks, 1988, 1992, 1994; 
Marks and Warner, 1991; Arieh and Marks, 2002)   
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• Whether the effect of the irrelevant dimension increases, decreases or 
rather is independent of the number of trials?  If the effect of the irrelevant 
dimension is considered like a noise it seems highly probable the effect to 
disappear with increasing the number of trials. Moreover, the effect of the on-
line contextually sensitive categorization that Goldstone (1995) reported may 
also decrease the impact of the irrelevant dimension in the course of time 
since assimilation toward perceptually similar and contrast from perceptually 
dissimilar objects work against the expected contrast effect due to the 
irrelevant dimension in all presented experiments. It could be, however, that 
the influence of the irrelevant information increases with time if participants 
enrich the range and frequency information for the stimuli with the number of 
trials. Then, it is more likely judges to become more sensitive to the irrelevant 
stimulus dimension with the number of trials. In order to test this 
contradictory issue in all experiments presented in the thesis, participants had 
to judge 3 times the same skewed stimuli set. 
 
The next several chapters present 7 experiments. Chapter 4 describes 2 
control experiments, which focus on the difference in length judgment 
depending on the Range and the Frequency principles. Although this 
difference was obtained through manipulation of the relevant to the task 
dimension it was considered as an empirical maximum effect for the rest 5 
experiments. Chapter 5 presents an experiment, which vary both the R and the 
Fr distribution of stimuli with respect to their irrelevant to the task dimension 
to see whether the obtained effect will be increased. Chapter 5 includes 2 
experiments that study the effect of several correlated irrelevant dimensions 
both with simple and complex stimuli again aiming the possible increase of 
the size of the effect. Chapter 6, presents an experiment on judgment of 
abstract stimuli, where the effect of the irrelevant dimension (if any) could 
hardly be described by “recalibration” of perceptual system sensitivity.  
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 All experiments have 2 common expectations. First, the positively 
skewed with respect to their irrelevant dimension stimuli to receive higher 
rating than the negatively skewed ones. Second, the impact of the irrelevant 
dimension was expected to be higher in the middle range (i.e., stimuli with 
magnitudes close to the mean the whole stimulus set) than in the extreme 
stimuli, since according to the range principle the smallest and the biggest 
stimuli should always be evaluated with 1 and 7, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Exploring Empirically the Maximal Possible Size of 
the Effect in Ideal Conditions 
This chapter is devoted to two experiments that study the maximum size 
of the shift in segments length judgment depending on the R and Fr principles 
(Parducci, 1965, 1971, 1974). Both experiments manipulate the two principles 
with respect to the relevant dimension, i.e. the length of the stimulus lines. 
The first experiment (control 1) explores difference between judgments of 
length of lines that differ in their length range and frequency of distribution. 
The second experiment (control 2) is focused on the difference between length 
judgments of positively and negatively skewed line sets.  
These experiments rely on manipulation of the R and Fr with respect to 
the relevant to the task length of the lines. Therefore, the observed effects will 
be considered the maximum possible shift in judgment of line length due to 
the irrelevant dimension. 
 
4.1. Control 1 Experiment: Judgment of lines that differ in 
length range and frequency distribution  
 
Control 1 explores the situation where both R and Fr “work” together, 
i.e., they push judgments in the same direction. This has to result in the 
highest displacement in judgment due to the impact of the whole stimulus 
distribution (Parducci, 1965, 1971, 1974). Control 1 aims at finding 
empirically the size of this effect in judgment of lines.  
Two stimulus sets were designed. One of them included relatively short 
and positively skewed lines. The other included relatively long and negatively 
skewed lines. These two sets of stimuli were given to two different groups of 
participants for judgment on a 7-point scale. Because the stimuli in both sets 
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differed in R, the impact of the context generated from the whole stimulus set 
was measured only on the 8 overlapping by length lines.  
 
4.1.1. Method 
• Design 
A between subject design was used. Independent variables was the 
group that differentiated two target sets of lines, i.e., relatively short positively 
skewed stimuli and relatively long negatively skewed stimuli. The dependent 
variable was ratings on a 7-point scale for each of the 8 common lines 
received from each group. 
• Stimuli 
14 black lines with different lengths were designed. The smallest one was 12 
pixels long, the longest one was 727 pixels long and the increment was 55 
pixels. The first 11 lengths of lines were included into positively skewed set of 
stimuli, i.e., shorter lines were presented more frequently than longer lines. 
Longer lines (the last 11 lengths), on the contrary, were presented more 
frequently in the negatively skewed set. The presentation frequency of the 
lines is presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Presentation frequency of the lines in Control 1 depending on the group. 
lines Length 
 in pixels 
presentation frequency 
in group 1 
presentation frequency 
in group 2 
1  12 16 - 
2 67 16 - 
3 122 16 - 
4 177 14 2 
5 232 12 4 
6 287 10 6 
7 342 8 8 
8 397 8 8 
9 452 6 10 
10 507 4 12 
11 562 2 14 
12 617 - 16 
13 672 - 16 
14 727 - 16 
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• Procedure 
Lines were presented randomly and horizontally against a gray 
background at the center of the 17-inch PC monitor. The lines appeared one 
by one on the screen and stay until participants judge them. The experimenter 
registered participant’s rating and changed the slide manually. The experiment 
took about 10 minutes. 
Participants were instructed to judge the length of each line presented 
on the screen on a 7-point scale: where 1-“it is not long at all” and 7-“it is very 
long”. 
• Participants 
13 students (10 females and 3 males) from the introductory classes in 
psychology at New Bulgarian University participated in the experiment. They 
received credits for participation. Six students participated in Group 1 and 
seven in Group 2.  
 
4.1.2. Results and discussion 
Data from each group was averaged by item (8 common lines) over 
participants. Overall, the 8 common for both sets lines were judged higher 
(mean=5.00; SD4=0.94) when participated in the set of relatively short 
positively skewed lines than within the set of relatively long and negatively 
skewed lines (mean=4.16, SD=0.96) (Figure 5).  
                                                          
4 SD-Standard Deviation 
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The difference between the 8 mean ratings received from both 
experimental groups was 0.84 (Table 6). It turns to be a significant difference 
tested with One-Sample T-test: t (7)=15.43; p=0.000. These results confirm 
the theoretical predictions of the Range-Frequency Theory, i.e., ratings of the 
same lines were shifted away from regions with high stimulus frequency and 
depending on the stimulus range. 
 
LENGH
T 
1110987654
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
GROU
P
POSITIVE 
NEGATIVE 
Mean 
Ratings 
Figure 5. Mean ratings of the common lines for each group. Black bars 
represents the mean ratings in the positively skewed set of short lines, 
while the gray textured bars, stand for the mean ratings in the negatively 
skewed set of long lines. 
Table 6. Mean, Standard Error, Standard Deviation and 95% confidence interval for the 
difference between judgments of short positively skewed and long negatively skewed lines.  
 Mean Std. 
Error 
Stand. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the difference 
Diff 0.84 0.054 0.154 0.711 0.968 
 
The correlation between ratings and line length was 0.980 (p=0.01). 
Thus, contrast due to the R and Fr variations seems to exist on the background 
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of high judgment precision (i.e. correlation between the judgment and the 
length of the lines).  
 
 4.2. Control 2 Experiment: Judgment of positively and 
negatively skewed lines  
 
The aim of control 2 was to find the empirical maximum of the 
difference in ratings of positively and negatively skewed distributions of lines 
keeping the range equal in both distributions. In the positively skewed set 
short lines were presented more frequent than long lines. On the contrary, in 
the negatively skewed set the long lines were presented more frequent than the 
short ones. These two unevenly distributed sets of stimuli were presented to 
two different groups of participants.  
 
4.2.1. Method 
• Design 
The experiment had a between subject design, where the independent 
variable was the group. It was varied on 2 levels depending on the stimulus 
distribution presented for judgment to the participants: positively and 
negatively skewed lines. The dependent variable was the rating of each line 
received from each group. 
 
• Stimuli 
A set of 14 black lines with different length was constructed. A shortest 
line was 180 pixels, the longest one was 505 pixels, and the increment was 25 
pixels. The frequency of the line’s presentation is described in Table 7.  
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Table7. Presentation frequency of lines in Control 2 for each group. 
 
lines Length 
in pixels 
Positively skewed 
distribution (group 1) 
Negatively skewed 
distribution (group 2) 
1  180 14 2 
2 205 14 2 
3 230 12 4 
4 255 12 4 
5 280 10 6 
6 305 10 6 
7 330 8 8 
8 355 8 8 
9 380 6 10 
10 405 6 10 
11 430 4 12 
12 455 4 12 
13 480 2 14 
14 505 2 14 
 
 
• Procedure 
Each line was presented horizontally against a light gray background at 
a random position on the screen. The lines were randomly selected from the 
set of positively or negatively skewed stimuli.  
Participants were instructed to judge the length of each line on a scale 
from 1 to 7, giving their rating through the keyboard. The slide was changed 
when participant pushed the respective button. The experiment lasts around 10 
minutes.  
• Participants 
32 (24 females and 8 males) students from different departments of New 
Bulgarian University took part in the experiment. 15 students participated in 
group 1 and 17 students in group 2. Participant’s age varied from 19-46 years. 
Part of them was enrolled for course credits, others- were paid (1 lv.) for their 
participation. 
 
4.2.2. Results and Discussion 
Data from each group was averaged by item (14 line lengths), i.e., 14 
mean ratings for the positively skewed set and 14 mean ratings for the 
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negatively skewed set. The mean of these 14 differences was 0, 73 (Table 8). 
T-test showed that the two groups were significantly different from each 
other: t (13) =11.816, p=0.000. Results were congruent with the predictions of 
Range-Frequency Theory that judgments of the same stimuli depend on the 
skew of the whole stimulus set. Although equal in length, positively skewed 
lines were rated higher (Mean=5.18, SD=1.34) than negatively skewed one 
(Mean=4.45, SD=1.43). Rating profile for each line in each skew condition is 
presented in Figure 6.  
 
Table 8. Mean, Standard Error, Standard Deviation and 95% confidence interval for the 
difference between judgments of short positively skewed and long negatively skewed lines. 
 Mean Std. 
Error 
Stand. 
Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the difference 
Diff 0.73 0.062 0.231 0.597 0.864 
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This experiment, like the previous one (control 1) also indicates 
significant correlation between ratings and length of the lines (r=0.954, 
p=0.01). 
 
Results from both control experiments outline the maximum difference 
due to the skew of the stimuli in judgment of line length. The difference, 
however, in judgment of positively and negatively skewed stimuli is 
calculated based on the responses of different experimental groups, i.e. one 
group judge positively skewed stimuli another negatively skewed stimuli. 
Experiments from the next 3 chapters rely on within subject design, where the 
same participants judge the lines that comprise both positively and negatively 
skewed set depending on their irrelevant to the task color. Thus, the difference 
in judgment of line length depending on the R and Fr could not be expected to 
Figure 6. Mean ratings of the lines for each group. Black bars represents the 
mean ratings in the positively skewed set of short lines, while the grey textured 
bars, stand for the mean ratings in the negatively skewed set of long lines. 
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be as high as in the control experiments. The obtained empirical differences 
outline the upper boundary of the effect rather than the expected size of the 
effect.  Moreover, JUDGEMAP-1 predicts that the comparison set will be 
formed dynamically for each stimulus separately and the color of the lines will 
take part in this process of comparison set formation as well as many other 
factors (e.g., recently judged stimuli, familiar exemplars of the target 
category). Therefore, JUDGEMAP-1 states that the target lines will retrieve in 
memory mixed sets of lines with respect to their color (i.e., the comparison set 
will contain both green and red lines but the green lines will be more when a 
green target is evaluated and the red lines will be more when a red target is 
evaluated). Thus, the mixed comparison set will be less positively or 
negatively skewed than the given stimulus set. Therefore, the expected 
difference would be much less that 0.73. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Experiment 1: Judgment of lines that differ both in 
Range and in Frequency with respect to their color 
 
Experiment 1 studies the impact of an irrelevant dimension on judgment 
of lines length. The lines differ both in their R and in Fr of presentation. Lines 
could be differentiated into two sets depending on their color, which was the 
irrelevant dimension in this experiment. Lines with color P were positively 
skewed, while lines with color N were negatively skewed one. Moreover, both 
sets differ not only in skew but also in range, i.e. positively skewed lines were 
relatively short one, while negatively skewed - relatively long ones. Thus, 
both contextual forces (the R and the Fr principles) were taken into account in 
this experiment.  
R and the Fr, however, were coded through the irrelevant to the task 
dimension, i.e. the color of the lines. Hence, the influence of both principles 
would be possible only if participants consider stimulus color in judgment of 
the length of the lines. Otherwise, judgment of the same line would not 
depend on its color but rather on the characteristics of the whole set which 
includes 14 uniformly distributed lines. Hence, the same line should receive 
the same rating independently of its color.  
The color was either green or red forming a set of positively or 
negatively skewed lines that differ in range. The experimental procedure was 
counterbalanced. One part of participants judged a set of short green lines and 
long red lines. Another part judged a set of short red lines and long green 
lines. The impact of the irrelevant dimension was measured on the eight 
common lines, which belong to the range of both positively and negatively 
skewed lines. Two middle length lines were expected to be more sensitive to 
the experimental manipulation than the rest 6 common lines, because of the Fr 
principle. It states that shift in judgments due to the skew of the stimulus 
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distribution is greater for the middle stimuli than for the end ones. This effect 
of context is usually called a nonlinear one.    
The number of trials was also considered. Participants rated twice the 
same mixed set of randomly presented green and red lines.  
 
5.1. Method 
• Design 
The group was a between subjects factor - the color of the relatively 
short positively skewed lines and relatively long negatively skewed lines 
depend on the group. 
The within-subjects factors color of the lines and number of stimulus 
presentation were varied on two levels: color - red and green; number of 
presentation - first 112 trials and second 112 trials. 
The dependent variable was rating of the eight identical in length but 
different in color lines.  
• Stimuli 
The same 14 lines used in Control 1 (line length varied from 12 to 727 
pixels, with the increment of 55 pixels) were presented 16 times each but with 
different color. The lines with color N formed a negatively skewed 
distribution, which range was between the first 11 lengths of the stimulus 
lines. The lines with color P, on the opposite, formed a positively skewed 
distribution, which range falls between the lengths 4 and 14. Stimulus 
distribution is presented in Table 9. The skew and color were counterbalanced 
between groups, i.e., positively skewed red and negatively skewed green lines 
were judged in the first group, while in the second group, on the opposite, the 
color of the positively skewed lines was green, while the color of the 
negatively skewed lines - red.  
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Table 9. Frequency and Color of the stimulus lines within a block of 112 trials. 
 
lines Length 
 in pixels 
Presentation of lines 
 with color P 
Presentation of lines  
with color N 
1  12 8 - 
2 67 8 - 
3 122 8 - 
4 177 7 1 
5 232 6 2 
6 287 5 3 
7 342 4 4 
8 397 4 4 
9 452 3 5 
10 507 2 6 
11 562 1 7 
12 617 - 8 
13 672 - 8 
14 727 - 8 
 
• Procedure 
Each line was horizontally presented 16 times in the center of the 17-
inch PC monitor against a gray background. Each line was presented 8 times 
within each block of 112 trials. The frequency and color of the lines 
distribution is shown in Table 9. Participants rated twice the same mixed set 
of randomly presented green and red lines, forming a set of 224 trials.  
Participants were instructed to judge the length of each line presented 
on the screen on a seven point scale, where 1-is not long at all and 7-it is very 
long.  
The experimenter registered participants’ ratings for each line and then 
changed the slides manually. Experiment lasted about 20 minutes. 
 
• Participants 
83 (49 female and 34 male) students from the introductory classes in 
psychology at New Bulgarian University participated in order to satisfy a 
course requirement. In Group1 participated 42 students in group 2 - 41. All 
participants denied knowing to be color-blind. 
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 5.2. Results and Discussion 
All the data was averaged by item (8 line lengths) for each participant. 
Repeated Measurement ANOVA show a non-significant influence of the 
between-subject factor group: F (1, 81) = 0.534, p= 0.467. The original (red or 
green) color of the lines was recoded in color P and color N depending on the 
stimulus skew. The color of the positively skewed stimuli (the red color of the 
stimuli from the first group and the green ones from the second group) was 
recoded into color P. The color of the negatively skewed set of lines (the green 
color of the stimuli from the first group and the red ones from the second 
group) was recoded as color N. 
The impact of the irrelevant dimension was examined first for 2 middle-
length lines (lines 7 and 8) common for both distributions. The mean ratings 
and Standard Errors for lines presented with color P and color N are shown in 
Table 10 and are visualized in Figure 7.  
 
Table 10. Mean ratings and Standard Errors of middle lines (lines 7 and 8) for color P, 
color N.  
color Mean Std. 
Error 
P (positive skew) 4.45 0.047 
N (negative skew) 4.41 0.050 
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Figure 7. Mean ratings of the middle length lines for each color. 
 
The difference in the mean ratings of the middle-length lines was 0.04. 
This difference turns to be significant tested with the Repeated Measurement 
statistics: F (1, 82) = 5.542, p=0.021. The effect size (ES) is 0.063. As was 
expected, positively skewed middle-length lines were rated higher than 
negatively skewed middle-length lines despite their equal length. Thus, the 
results could be considered as confirming the influence of the irrelevant 
dimension. The effect of the within-subject factor “number of trials” was non-
significant: F (1,82)=0.193, p=0.662. The interaction between the factors for 
the middle-length lines was also non-significant. 
Contrary to the expectations, however, the difference between 
judgments of the eight common lines depending on their color was not 
significant tested with the repeated measurement analysis (F (1,82) = 1.098, 
p=0.298). The effect of within-subject factor number of trials was also non-
significant (F (1, 82)=1.001, p=0.320) but the interaction between number of 
trials (first and second 112 trials) and color reached significance (F (1, 82) 
=3.090, p=0.083). The mean ratings and Standard Errors for lines with color P 
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(i.e., short positively skewed lines) and lines with color N (i.e., long 
negatively skewed lines) for each block of trials is presented at Table 11. 
Table 11. Mean and Standard Error of ratings of length of all lines for line’s color and 
number of stimulus presentation.  
Color Number of 
trials 
Mean 
judgment 
Std. 
Error 
First 112 trials 4.40 0.048 P (relatively short positively 
skewed lines) Second 112 trials 4.39 0,043 
First 112 trials 4.41 0.046 N (relatively long negatively 
skewed lines) Second 112 trials 4.36 0.044 
 
Repeated measurement analysis on ratings from the second 112 trials 
reveals a significant main effect of color (F (1, 82) =6.021, p=0.016, 
ES=0.069). The appearance of the expected effect of color during the second 
block of presentation contradicts the idea that contextual effects may 
disappear with time. Therefore, they cannot be considered noise during the 
initial calibration process. 
Like in Control 1 the correlation between ratings and line lengths was 
significant: r= 0.93, p=0.01. It seems that, the observed effect of the irrelevant 
to the task dimension did not affect judgment precision. Thus, it can be 
considered that either participants were very precise in judgment of the line 
length or the impact of the irrelevant dimension was not strong enough to 
reduce this judgment precision. 
  
Experiment 1 demonstrated the effect of irrelevant dimension on 
judgments of the middle lines and also on judgment of all lines during the 
second 112 trials. The judgments of the lines were displaced by the context 
originated from the irrelevant to the task stimulus dimension. The observed 
contrast effect was congruent with the experimental manipulations and the 
data obtained with similar methodology (Kokinov et al., 2004). The same line 
was judged to be longer when its color was the same as that of short positively 
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skewed lines set than when its color was like the one of the long negatively 
skewed line set.  
The reported shift in judgments due to the irrelevant dimension of the 
stimuli was further enough from the empirical maximum of 0,84 outlined by 
Control 1, but JUDGEMAP-1 did not predict that the effect of irrelevant 
dimension would be comparable to this empirical maximum. Moreover, the 
shift in judgments was not substantially higher compared with the difference 
of 0,046 measured in the previous experiment (Kokinov et al., 2004). 
Therefore, addition of the R principle was not enough for enlarging the effect 
of the irrelevant to the task dimension.  The effect increased with the number 
of trials which may indicate that participants became more sensitive to the 
irrelevant information at the end of the experiment rather than at its beginning. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Experiment 2: Judgment under “perceptual limitations” 
 
Stimulus lines were projected for a short time (100ms) that allows 
participants only to detect stimulus but not to compare it unrestrictedly to the 
rest of the surrounding sources of useful information. This peculiarity of the 
experimental procedure seemed enough for causing troubles on judgment 
process. Since contextual effects in judgment could be considered as mistakes, 
the contextual effect due to the irrelevant dimension may increase under these 
circumstances. It was assumed that presentation limitations would make 
judgment harder and would cause more mistakes and smaller precision in 
judgment. The restricted external sources of relational information and the 
possibility for more mistakes seem to enable the possible influence of 
irrelevant information upon retrieval of similar elements in the WM.  
Participants were asked to judge the length of lines that appear always 
horizontally, but in random positions on the screen. Each line was projected 
for a very short time on the computer screen- for only 100ms. The subsequent 
answer did not require a prompt, rather the computer "wait" for the 
participants’ answers. The Ss were instructed to press the button when they 
are sure what rating the target line deserves.  
 
6.1. Method  
• Design  
The within subject independent variables were color (varying at 2 
levels) of the lines and number of trials (first, second, and third 112 
presentations). The experimental design was counterbalanced in order the 
positively and the negatively skewed stimuli to be presented either in green or 
in red. In the first experimental group, the green lines were positively skewed, 
while red lines form negatively skewed distribution. In the second 
experimental group, red lines were positively skewed, while green lines were 
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negatively skewed. The dependent variables were the mean rating of line 
lengths on a 7-point-scale. 
 
• Stimuli 
The same 14 lines as in Control 2 (the length varied from 180 pixels to 
505 pixels with 25 pixels increment) were presented 8 times each forming a 
basic set of 112 trials. Participants rated 3 times the same set of randomly 
presented 112 trials. Thus, experiment comprises 336 trials (112 trials for a 
block x 3). Each line was presented either in red or in green. The frequency 
distribution of lines in the first experimental group, for one block of 112 trials 
is presented in Table 12. In second experimental group the presentation of 
lines was just on the opposite, i.e., red lines formed positively skewed 
distribution (include relatively short lines) and green lines formed negatively 
skewed one (include relatively long lines). 
 
Table 12. Frequency and color of the lines for a block of 112 trials presented to group 1, 
where green lines were positively skewed and red lines were negatively skewed one.  
Lines Length 
in pixels 
 Number of the green lines  
(Positively skewed 
distribution) 
Number of the red lines 
(Negatively skewed 
distribution) 
1 180 7 1 
2 205 7 1 
3 230 6 2 
4 255 6 2 
5 280 5 3 
6 305 5 3 
7 330 4 4 
8 355 4 4 
9 380 3 5 
10 405 3 5 
11 430 2 6 
12 455 2 6 
13 480 1 7 
14 505 1 7 
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• Procedure 
Each line was presented horizontally against a gray background in a 
random position on the screen for 100 ms. Participants were instructed to 
press a button from 1 to 7 on the keyboard whenever they are sure on their 
rating. They were also asked to leave their hand on the desk after each 
pressing of the key in order to be sure that the time for reaching each button 
on a keyboard is relatively equal. When participant pressed the button 
corresponding to his/hers answer the next line appeared on the screen. The 
lines were presented within three blocks with the same range and frequency 
distribution like the one presented at Table 12.  
The experiment was conducted in sound-attenuated room and lasts 
around 15 minutes.    
Participants: 31 students (17 female and 14 male) from New Bulgarian 
University participated in the experiment. Participants’ age varied between 19 
and 31 years. Part of them participates in order to satisfy a course requirement, 
others were paid 1 lv. In group 1 participated 16 students, in the second group 
– 15 students. 
 
6.2. Results and Discussion 
Data was averaged by item (14 lengths). Each participant has 28 mean 
judgments (14 lines*2 colors). Color and number of trials were analyzed as a 
within-subject factor, while group was a between subject factor. Repeated 
Measurement Analyses shown a non-significant main effect of group: F (1, 
30) = 0.215, p=0.646. Thus for plainness, I will use color P as indicating 
positively skewed lines and color N – negatively skewed lines rather than the 
particular red or green color of the lines used during the experiment. 
 The main effect of the irrelevant dimension (color P vs. color N) on 
rating of the middle lines was significant estimated with the Repeated 
Measurement Analysis: F (1, 30) =4.400, p=0.045, ES=0.132. The difference 
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between mean judgment of positively skewed lines (5.01) and mean judgment 
of negatively skewed lines (4.92) was 0.09 (Table 13). Positively skewed 
middle-length lines were rated higher than negatively skewed middle-length 
lines despite they were equal in length (Figure 8).  
 
Table 13. Mean, Standard Error of middle lengths ratings (lines 7 and 8). Color P stands for 
positively skewed stimuli, color N – for negatively skewed ones. 
 
Color Mean 
ratings 
Std. 
Error 
color P  (positively skewed lines) 5.01 0.088 
color N  (negatively skewed lines) 4.92 0.088 
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Figure 8. Mean ratings of the middle line lengths for each color. Black bar 
stands for ratings of the positively skewed lines with respect to their color, 
while gray textured bar – for negatively skewed with respect to color lines. 
Repeated Measurement Analysis, however, did not show a significant 
main effect of color and of number of trials on the mean ratings of all 14 lines 
(color: F (1, 30) =0.070, p=0.793; number of trials: F (2,30) = 1.354, p= 
0.266). The effect of the skewed with respect to lines’ color context, appeared 
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not strong enough to transfer from the middle toward all lengths of the target 
lines.   
Like in the previous experiments, the correlation between ratings and 
line length was significant (r= 0.8, p=0.01). 
 
The effect of the irrelevant dimension differs in decimals from 
contextual effects reported in the previous experiments (i.e., control 2 and 
experiment 1). The effect of color did not increase under the presentation 
limitations imposed on participants in this experiment. It could be, however, 
that participants got the regularity in stimulus presentation. Each line is 
presented immediately after the answer was given by the push of a 
corresponding key.  If participants got this rhythm, they may adjust their 
behavior in order to have enough time for the stimulus perception and 
judgment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Two or More Correlated Irrelevant Dimensions 
 
Experiments reported in this section explore the possibility of enlarging 
the impact of the irrelevant information by adding several correlated irrelevant 
dimensions to the target stimuli.  This idea closely represents a prediction of 
JUDGEMAP-1 model, namely that the activation spreading along several 
dimensions that feed the same information raise the possibility this particular 
information to be elicited in the WM compared with the situation where only 
one dimension activate the same information. Thus, the most active element in 
WM is the element that shares nearly all features of the target stimulus. 
Hence, if several irrelevant dimensions correlate the irrelevant information 
would have higher chances to direct memory retrieval. As a result, the context 
understood like the content of the WM would include more elements that 
share the same irrelevant to the task information. 
Experiment 3 used judgment of line length accompanied always by a 
particular sound associated with the lines’ color.  Experiment 4 studies the 
impact of several correlated dimensions on judgment of more complex stimuli 
than lines, namely, of the size of rabbits. 
 
7.1. Experiment 3: Color and Sound 
 
The goal of this experiment was to explore the situation in which 
stimuli could be characterized as sharing one relevant to the task characteristic 
and several irrelevant. In DUAL, the activation of particular agents in the 
LTM should increase if the agents receive activation simultaneously from 
several nodes. To test this possibility, positively skewed lines were joined 
with a particular sound (“laser”) and negatively skewed lines - with another 
sound (“whoosh”). Thus positively skewed exemplars should receive greater 
activation when a line from the same set is judged in comparison with a 
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situation in which the lines differ only by their color. This manipulation may 
help to elicit with higher probability the exemplars that belong to the target 
category. Then if the content of WM depends on irrelevant information and 
retrieved exemplars are used for the consequent judgment, the effect of 
irrelevant dimensions should be greater. 
 
7.1.1 Method 
• Design: 
The irrelevant dimension (color-sound variable) was a within-subject 
independent variable that was varied in two levels: red-whoosh and green-
laser. Another within-subject independent variable was the number of trials, 
which was varied on 3 levels. The color-sound variable was counterbalanced 
across groups. Color of the positively skewed lines was green in the first 
group and red in the second group. The color of the negatively skewed lines 
was red in the first group and green in the second group.  
The dependent variable was the 7-point rating of each line length. 
• Stimuli 
The same 14 lines used in the experiment 2 were presented with the 
same frequency depending on their irrelevant characteristics within each block 
of 112 trials: lines with lengths 1 and 2 were presented 7 times in green to the 
accompaniment of the “laser” sound, lines with lengths 3 and 4 - 6 times and 
so on. Participants rated 3 times the same set of 112 randomly presented trials. 
• Procedure 
Procedure was similar to the experiment 2 described in the previous 
section, but without any time limitations for presentation of lines. Each line 
appears simultaneously with a particular sound - green line with “laser” 
sound, red lines with “whoosh” sound. The lines were randomly presented 
within 3 sets that share the same stimulus range and frequency forming a 
sequence of 336 trials (112 trials x 3 times). 
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• Participants 
29 students (15 female and 14 male) from New Bulgarian University 
distributed in two groups (group 1 -13 students, group 2- 16 students) take 
part in this experiment. The age of the participants ranged between 18 and 35 
years. Part of them participates in order to satisfy a course requirement, others 
were paid 1 lv. 
 
7.1.2. Results and Discussion 
Data was averaged by item (14 lines). Repeated measurement analysis 
show a non-significant effect of group: F (1, 28) =1.363, p=0.253. Thus, the 
original red or green color of the lines was recoded into color P and color N 
with respect to the skew indicated by the irrelevant to the task color of the 
lines. Color P stands for positively skewed green lines associated with the 
“laser” sound at group 1 and for positively skewed red lines associated with 
the “whoosh” sound at group 2. Color N, represents negatively skewed red 
lines associated with the “whoosh” sound at group 1 and negatively skewed 
green lines associated with the “laser” sound at group 2.  
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 Repeated Measurement Analysis showed a non-significant main effect 
of color (F (1, 28) = 1.929, p=0.176) but significant interaction between the 
number of trials and the color of the lines (F (2, 28) = 4.944, p=0.011) for the 
middle-length lines. The expected contrast due to the irrelevant dimension 
appeared during the third 112 presentations (Figure 9).   
 
 
During the first and second 112 presentations negatively skewed lines 
were judged higher than positively skewed lines, while this tendency was 
turned around during the last 112 presentation and the expected contrast 
appeared (i.e., positively skewed lines were started to be judged higher than 
negatively skewed ones with the same length) (Table 14).  This tendency, 
however, observed at the end of the experiment was not strong enough to be 
NUMBER OF TRIALS
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Figure 9.Mean ratings of the middle length lines for each color and number 
of trials, i.e., 1 stands for the firs 112 trials, 2-for the second 112 trials, 3 – 
for the third 112 trials.
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estimated as significant from the Repeated Measurement Analysis: F 
(1,28)=0.418, p=0.523. 
 
 Color P  Color N Difference 
 mean Std. Error 
 
mean Std. Error 
 
Color P-color N 
First 112 trials 4.862 0.105 4.914 0.105 -0.052 
Second 112 trials 4.987 0.116 5.099 0.108 -0.112 
Third 112 trials 5.151 0.105 5.121 0.108  0.030 
Table 14. Mean, Standard Error of middle lengths ratings (lines 7 and 8) for each color and 
number of trials.  Color P stands for positively skewed stimuli, color N – for negatively 
skewed ones. 
 
Like for the middle lines, the effect of color on judgment of the length 
of all 14 lines was also non-significant tested with the Repeated Measurement 
Analysis (F (1, 28) =2.080, p=0.160). The within-subject factor number of 
trials caused a significant main effect on judgments: F (2,28)=10.830, 
p=0.000, ES=0.279. The insignificant tendency observed in judgment of all 14 
lines to be rated higher when was negatively skewed than positively skewed 
decreases significantly with the number of trials.  
Like in the rest of the reported experiments, the correlation between 
rating and line length was significant 0.82 (p=0.01).  
The lack of statistically significant effect may be due to the second 
irrelevant dimension added in this experiment in comparison to the first one. 
The sounds could be perceived as quite different from participants and thus 
giving the opportunity for opposing shifts in their judgments. As Goldstone 
(1995) showed in his experiments, people are inclined to assimilate their 
judgments toward a category if they perceive the target as similar to it. 
Moreover, judgments may be assimilated toward categories that are 
constructed on-line based only on some sort of contextually sensitive 
similarities. It is possible that, in experiment2 two contextual forces are acting 
against each other – contrast that is due to the skew of lines against 
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assimilation toward the categories of lines, which appear along with “laser” or 
“whoosh” sound. “Whoosh” and “laser” sound were different enough to 
provoke such effect.  
On the other hand, the experimental manipulation could be obvious 
enough and participants may realize the idea of the experiment. Most of the 
participants shared the idea that the experiment was probably about the sound. 
Although none of them was sure what exactly was expected to happen, this 
according to Martin et al. (1990) may motivate participants to overcome the 
effect of context, e.g. to neglect the irrelevant information and to focus only 
on the relevant to the task line length. 
 
7.2. Experiment 4: Judgment of the size of the Rabbits 
Experiment 4 also tests the same hypothesis about the effect of several 
correlated dimensions on judgment. The stimuli, however, were more 
complex in comparison with the lines used in experiment 4, namely, rabbits. 
People were asked to judge the size of dappled white rabbits with red eyes and 
yellowish ear, and of homogeneously black rabbits with blue eyes and pink 
ears. The similarity between stimuli with respect to their irrelevant to the task 
characteristics was varied on five dimensions: color (black or white), pattern 
(homogenous or dappled), color of the eyes (red or blue) and color of the ears 
(yellowish or pink). All these irrelevant dimensions were correlated in the 
experiment. The expectation was that more differences between stimuli may 
increase the effect of the irrelevant to the task stimulus information.   
 
7.2.1.Method 
• Design 
The independent variables were the color of the rabbits (dappled rabbits 
with red eyes and yellowish ear and homogeneously black rabbits with blue 
eyes and pink ears) and the number of trials (first and second 112 
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presentations). The group counterbalanced the irrelevant to the task color of 
the rabbits and the stimulus skew. Group 1 judged a mixture between 
positively skewed white dappled rabbits and negatively skewed black rabbits. 
Group 2 judged a mixture between positively skewed homogeneously black 
rabbits and negatively skewed white dappled rabbits. The dependent variable 
was the participant’s 7-point rating depending on the stimulus color. 
• Stimuli 
A set of 14 rabbits with different sizes was designed. The smallest 
image of the rabbit was 150 pixels in width and 119 pixels in height, the 
largest image was 837 pixels in width and 663 pixels in height. Each stimulus 
image was 12% larger than the previous in the series. The frequency of the 
stimuli was calculated in order to receive a positively and negatively skewed 
sets depending on the stimulus color. The color distribution within the set of 
all 112 stimuli (14 sizes x 8 times) is presented in Table 15.  
 
Table 15. Frequency distribution and color of the stimuli (where 1 represents image size of 
150 pixels in width and 119 in height, stimulus 2 - 204 pixels in width and 162 in height 
and so on). 
 size  Presentation 
frequency for rabbits 
with color P 
Presentation 
frequency for rabbits 
with color N 
1 and 2 14 2 
3 and 4 12 4 
5 and 6 10 6 
7 and 8 8 8 
9 and 10 6 10 
11 and 12 4 12 
13 and 14 2 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Procedure 
The experiment was conducted individually in sound-attenuated room. 
Each stimulus was presented 8 times within set of 112 trials. All 112 stimuli 
were randomly presented for judgment 2 times forming a sequence of 224 
trials.  
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Participants were instructed to judge the size of each rabbit presented on 
the screen on a seven-point scale: where 1-“it is not big at all” and 7-“it is 
very big”. The experimenter registered participant’s rating and changed the 
slides manually. No time restrictions have been imposed on the participants. 
The experiment lasted about 20 minutes. 
 
• Participants 
85 students (56 female and 29 male) from the introductory classes in 
psychology at New Bulgarian University participated in order to satisfy a 
course requirement. 46 of the participants took part in group 1 and the rest 39 
participated in group 2. 
 
7.2.2. Results and discussion 
Like in previous experiments, the data was averaged by 14 sizes of the 
rabbits. The Repeated Measurement ANOVA revealed a non-significant effect 
of the group (F (1, 84) =0.156, p=0.694) but a significant interaction between 
color and group: F (1, 84)=17.928, p=0.000). Figure 10 illustrates the mean 
Mean 
Ratings 
4,70
Group 2Group 1
4,60
4,50
COLOR 
POSITIVE 
NEGATIVE 
4,40
4,30
GROUP
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Figure 10. Mean differences in judgment of rabbit’s size depending 
on the stimulus color and experimental group. 
differences in judgments of the 14 rabbit sizes depending on their color and 
for each group. The effect of color was significant at the first experimental 
group (F (1, 45) = 38.727, p=0.000, ES=0.463) but insignificant at the second 
group (F (1,38)=0.937, p=0.339, ES=0.24).  
It seems that black rabbits were underestimated in comparison with the 
white rabbits. Probably, participants saw the black rabbits as smaller than the 
white spotted ones. Since the data from both groups was combined, the 
possible perceptual size illusion should be counterbalanced. Thus, the recoded 
data (from the original white and black color to color P and color N) will 
reveal only the effect of the irrelevant dimension rather than the effect of the 
perceptual size illusion that possibly were registered in the data. 
The Repeated Measurement Analysis performed on this collapsed data 
revealed a significant effect of color (color P and color N) on judgment of the 
middle rabbits (F (1,84)=7.318, p= 0.008, ES=0.087). Middle-sized positively 
skewed rabbits were judged higher (mean=4.45) than negatively skewed ones 
(mean=4.43). The difference was 0.02. The effect of number of trials was 
estimated as non-significant: F (1,84)=2.595, p=0.111. 
Repeated Measurement Analysis on all 14 rabbits sizes also showed a 
significant main effect of the within-subject factor color: F (1,84)=27.478, 
p=0.000, ES=0.246 (Figure 11). 
The mean ratings and Standard Errors   for each color (color P and 
color N) are presented in Table 16. The difference (0.06) between all 
positively and all negatively skewed rabbits was in the expected direction, i.e., 
rabbits that share color P were rated higher than rabbits that share color N 
despite their equal size.  
The mean ratings and Standard Errors   for each color (color P and 
color N) are presented in Table 16. The difference (0.06) between all 
positively and all negatively skewed rabbits was in the expected direction, i.e., 
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Figure11. Mean judgments of each stimulus size depending on its color. 
rabbits that share color P were rated higher than rabbits that share color N 
despite their equal size.  
 
The mean ratings and Standard Errors   for each color (color P and 
color N) are presented in Table 16. The difference (0.06) between all 
positively and all negatively skewed rabbits was in the expected direction, i.e., 
rabbits that share color P were rated higher than rabbits that share color N 
despite their equal size.  
Table 16. Mean ratings and Standard Errors   of all rabbit sizes for each color.  
Color Mean ratings Std. Error 
 
Color P (positively skewed stimuli) 4.41 0.045 
Color N (negatively skewed stimuli) 4.35 0.045 
 
The effect of the within-subject factor number of trials was also 
estimated as significant for all 14 stimuli: F (1,84)= 7.274, p=0.008, 
ES=0.079. The effect of color decreases with time. The mean ratings and 
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Standard Errors   for each color and block of 112 trials are presented in table 
17.  
 
Table 17. Mean ratings and Standard Errors   depending on time and color.  
 
Color Time Mean 
ratings 
Std. Error 
First 112 trials 4.50 0.062 Color P 
 (positively skewed stimuli) Second 112 trials 4.36 0.058 
First 112 trials 4.43 0.056 Color N 
 (negatively skewed stimuli) Second 112 trials 4.39 0.056 
 
Although stimuli were slightly more complex than the lines usually 
judged in the rest of the experiments, the correlation between judgment and 
size of the rabbits were significantly high: r = 0.90, p=0.01.  
 
Both experiments reveal contradictory results. On one side, experiment 
3 did not manifest any influence of irrelevant to the task color and sound. On 
the other side, experiment 4 reveals the expected effect of color of the rabbits 
on judgment of their size. The effect of the irrelevant dimension was 
confirmed at judgment of the size of both the middle size rabbits and the all-
14 rabbit sizes. The difference in judgment of the same stimuli depending on 
their color was comparable in size to the effects reported in previous two 
sections. Thus, the impact of the irrelevant dimension was not enhanced 
essentially from correlation between several irrelevant dimensions. 
The effect of the number of trials, however, observed in experiment 4 
may result from the same forces that probably blocked out the influence of the 
irrelevant dimension in experiment 3. Since the stimuli were designed to be 
very dissimilar with respect to several irrelevant dimensions the on-line 
assimilation toward perceptually similar and on-line contrast from 
perceptually dissimilar stimuli could be brought into play (Goldstone, 1995). 
The two experiments, however, differ on the number of the presented for 
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judgment stimuli. During experiment 3, were presented 3 sets of 112 stimuli, 
while in experiment 4 – 2 sets. Moreover, the effect of color was insignificant 
at experiment 3. Thus, the comparison between both experiments seems quite 
speculative. That is why, the time behavior of the effect of the effect of several 
correlated irrelevant dimensions could be considered as indefinite.  
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CHAPTER 8 
Reduced Perceptual Support 
The experiment described in this chapter is trying to differentiate the 
source of the effect, i.e. whether the effect of the irrelevant to the task 
dimension is comparable to the effect of sensory adaptation (for discussion see 
Arieh and Marks, 2002). The stimuli used in this experiment are quite abstract 
– they are numbers – and thus their color cannot effect their perception like in 
the previous experiments with line lengths. Thus if there is an effect of their 
color it cannot be attributed to the calibration process of the perceptual system 
as in other experiments on judgment of lines’ length, loudness of tones, taste 
or touching (for detailed review, Arieh and Marks, 2002). It is difficult to 
argue that judgment of men’ age based on digits, which stand for their 
absolute age in years may “induce perceptual system to recalibrate their 
relative supra-threshold responsiveness”(Arieh and Marks, 2002, p.478). 
 
8.1. Judgment of age: Experiment 5 
 
The main idea of this experiment was to investigate whether the effect 
of irrelevant dimension can be demonstrated with stimuli with higher 
complexity. Participants were asked to rate men’ age based on green and red 
digits representing their age in years. Several strategies may be used for the 
fulfillment of this task, e.g. participants may visualize a man on a particular 
age in order to judge it or participants may base their judgment only on digits’ 
height rather than representation. No matter what the strategy of participants 
is, it is difficult to suppose that judgments may be influenced from the digits’ 
color. Thus, experiment 5 tests the effect of irrelevant dimension on judgment 
of stimuli that could not profit by perceptual input, i.e. the age do not depend 
on the size of the screen nor the age judgments can be affected from any 
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recalibrations of the “relative supra-threshold responsiveness” of the 
perceptual system (Arieh and Marks, 2002, p.478). 
 
8.1.1. Method 
• Design 
Like all experiments in this research, color and number of trials were 
within–subject variables. The group counterbalanced age and color: group 1 
judged the age of small positively skewed red numbers and high negatively 
skewed green numbers. The dependent variable was the participant’s mean 
rating for each age depending on the digit’s color.  
• Stimuli 
A set of 14 ages was designed. The lower age was 10 years, the higher 
age – 75 years and the increment was 5 years. Like previous experiments, the 
ages were presented with uneven frequency depending on the digit’s color. 
The frequency of the stimulus distribution depending on stimulus color is 
presented in Table 18.  
 
Table 18. Frequency of stimulus distribution depending on the irrelevant to the task color of 
the digits.  
 Age 
category 
The digit 
representing the 
target age 
Frequency 
distribution of the 
ages with color P 
Frequency 
distribution of the 
ages with color N 
1 10 7 1 
2 15 7 1 
3 20 6 2 
4 25 6 2 
5 30 5 3 
6 35 5 3 
7 40 4 4 
8 45 4 4 
9 50 3 5 
10 55 3 5 
11 60 2 6 
12 65 2 6 
13 70 1 7 
14 75 1 7 
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 • Procedure 
Stimuli were presented for judgment one by one at the center of the 
computer screen. The background was gray. Similarly to the rest of the 
described experiments, stimuli were randomly presented within 2 sets with the 
same stimulus range and frequency. Participants rated twice the set of 
randomly presented 112 trials described in Table 18. 
Judgments were required on a 7-point scale. Each age stay on a screen 
until the participant did not judge it. Then the experimenter registers 
respondents’ rating and changes the slide manually. Experiment’s duration 
was 15 minutes.  
 
• Participants 
31 (25 female and 6 male) on age between 19 and 29 years take part in 
the experiment for credits. 18 students participated in group 1 and 13 in group 
2. 
 
8.1.2. Results and Discussion 
Data was averaged for each age. The between-subject factor group 
showed no effect: F (1,30)=0.083, p=0.775. Thus, like in the rest experiments, 
the original color was recoded into color P for the positively skewed stimuli 
and color N for the negatively skewed ones. Positively skewed middle ages 
received higher judgments than negatively skewed ones with respect to the 
recoded color (color P and color N). The mean ratings and Standard Errors for 
color P and colors N are presented in Table 19. The profile of the ratings with 
respect to the lines’ color is presented at Figure 11.The effect of color on 
judgments of ages 40 and 45 years reach marginal significance tested with the 
Repeated Measurement Statistics: F (1,30)=3.497, p=0.072, ES=0.108. The 
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main effect of the within-subject factor number of trials was non-significant 
for the middle-range of the stimulus ages (F (1,30)=0.642, p=0.429). 
 
Table 19. Mean ratings and Standard Error for the middle ages color. 
 Color Mean 
ratings 
Std. Error 
Color P (positively skewed)  4.09 0.090 
Color N  (negatively skewed) 4.04 0.098 
 
 
 
 
Color NColor P
4 0
4 0
4 0
4 0
4 0
Mean 
Rating  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Color 
 
Figure 11. Mean ratings of the middle ages for each color. Black bar stands for the 
positively skewed lines. Gray textured bar represents the negatively skewed lines.  
 
 
The main effect of color and number of trials was non-significant for 
the whole range of ages (10years-75 years) (color: F (1,30)=1.567, p=0.221; 
number of trials: F (1,30)=0.577, p=0.453). The correlation between judgment 
and age was significantly high: 0.94, p=0.01. 
 
Results from experiment 5 are congruent with the results obtained from 
the rest of the experiments reported in this thesis. It demonstrates similar in 
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direction, scope (middle lengths) and size, effect of the irrelevant to the task 
color on judgment of middle stimuli, i.e. ages 40 and 45.  
Surprisingly, the effect of irrelevant dimension was observed on the 
background of quite high correlation between the judgment and the magnitude 
(0.94). This correlation was probably a result from the stimulus selection.  
Participants used quite simple strategy of judging stimuli according to the first 
digit: e.g., ages 10 and 15 with 1, ages 20 and 25 with 2, ages 30 and 35 with 
3. The effect of color, however, appeared despite this stair-like profile of 
judgment. 
Although the effect of the color reached only marginal significance, the 
results seem encouraging in the sense that they replicate the previous ones 
obtained with simple stimuli. Moreover, the behavior of the effect seems quite 
predictable, i.e. the same contextual shift mainly within the middle stimuli at 
comparable intensity. The most important observation of this experiment is 
that the effect of irrelevant dimension was demonstrated with complex stimuli. 
Therefore, it seems difficult, if possible at all, to account for the influence of 
irrelevant to the task dimension by referring to the low-level mechanisms like 
“recalibration” of perceptual system sensitivity (Marks, 1988, 1992, 1994, 
Marks and Warner, 1991, Arieh and Marks, 2002). It is possible, however, 
that context influences judgment at several different levels of information 
processing. It could also be the case that contextually sensitive processes are 
running in parallel and give raise to different shifts in human judgments (some 
of which can be congruent and others can be canceling each other). This 
additionally impedes the development of detailed and elaborate description of 
the judgment process.   
Overall, it seems that, the spreading activation mechanism may better 
describe the effect of the irrelevant information with such complex stimuli 
than the “early local changes in receptive sensitivity” proposed by Marks and 
colleges (Marks, 1988, 1992, 1994, Marks and Warner, 1991, Arieh and 
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Marks, 2002). Moreover, unlike perceptual learning mechanisms (Goldstone, 
1995, 1998) that are also argued to be able to account for contextual effects in 
judgment of complex stimuli, JUDGEMAP-1 proposes mechanisms that are 
detailed enough to be tested experimentally. 
In conclusion, the results of this experiment provide supporting 
evidence, that judgment of complex stimuli could be influenced by stimulus 
irrelevant dimension just like judgment of more simple stimuli like lines. The 
spreading activation mechanism is able to account for these results because it 
does not pose any limits on stimulus complexity. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
assume that irrelevant stimulus dimension affect judgment on different levels 
of the information processing, e.g. relatively early by means of perceptual 
“recalibration” (Marks, 1988, 1992, 1994, Marks and Warner, 1991, Arieh 
and Marks, 2002) and perceptual learning mechanisms (Goldstone, 1995) and 
also relatively late in information processing through contextually sensitive 
retrieval.
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion 
 
9.1. Conclusion and future work 
 
The main goal of the presented research was to test a specific prediction 
of JUDGEMAP-1 Model, namely that the irrelevant characteristics of the 
stimuli may influence judgment. According to JUDGEMAP-1 the target 
stimulus is not be judged in isolation but rather within a contextually sensitive 
set that comprises both some perceived environmental stimuli and retrieved 
exemplars from the LTM (similar, familiar exemplars, generalized prototypes 
if such exist in LTM, and recently judged stimuli). The mechanism 
responsible for the retrieval of the relevant information from the LTM is 
spreading activation. Thus, it turns out, that according to JUDGEMAP-1 
model the information needed for judgment embraces the whole information 
that the stimulus posses. Therefore, judgment process may be affected by both 
the relevant dimension(s) and the irrelevant stimulus dimensions (i.e., the 
additional information that is not required to be judged in a particular 
judgment task). It is quite possible, of course, that the irrelevant information 
has a smaller weight in the judgment process than the relevant one, but 
nevertheless, it takes part in judgment.  
Other researchers proposed the same idea but they situated the 
mechanism responsible for this effect on the level of perception (Arieh and 
Marks, 2002) and peceptual categorization (Goldstone, 1995). For example, 
Arieh and Marks (2002) argued that the effect of irrelevant dimension was 
comparable to the effect of sensory adaptation. Receptors recalibrate the input 
depending on irrelevant to the task dimension. Many experiments that require 
judgment of simple stimuli from various modalities reported a contrastive 
shift in judgment depending on the context created by the irrelevant dimension 
(e.g., Rankin and Marks, 1991, 1992, 2000; Marks and Armstrong, 1996; 
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Armstrong and Marks, 1997; Potts, 1991; Arieh and Marks, 2002). Some 
experiments (Goldstone, 1995), however, demonstrated assimilation effect 
due to the irrelevant stimulus dimension and argue that this may be a 
perceptually driven process.   
Unlike these experiments (Rankin and Marks, 1991, 1992, 2000; Marks 
and Armstrong, 1996; Armstrong and Marks, 1997; Potts, 1991; Arieh and 
Marks, 2002; Goldstone (1995)), however, the reported research varied the 
frequency rather than the range of the stimuli depending on stimulus irrelevant 
dimension(s). The stimuli were skewed with respect to the irrelevant to the 
task color rather than differentiated as having different end points. Moreover, 
the effect reported in this paper was demonstrated across stimuli with different 
complexity and level of concreteness/abstraction, e.g. judgment of line length, 
judgment of rabbit size and judgment of the age. The effect seems 
independent of stimulus complexity and abstraction level and hence sensory 
adaptation (Arieh and Marks, 2002) can not account for it. It seems difficult to 
argue for an effect of sensory adaptation in judgment of age described with 
numbers. It is probable, however, the effect of the irrelevant stimulus 
dimension reported in the presented experiments to be a result from perceptual 
learning. As Goldstone (1995, 1998) argued, perceptual learning could 
account for contextual effects in judgment despite stimulus complexity. In 
general, the interplay between perceptual learning and high level process like 
judgment needs further and more detailed discussion.  
Overall, the effect of irrelevant dimension was demonstrated in 5 out of 
6 experiments (including the initial experiment by Kokinov et. al., 2004) that 
certainly contradict traditional theories of judgment. The reported series of 
experiments shows that judgment is sensitive to the irrelevant to the task 
attributes of the stimuli. On the contrary, traditional theories of judgment 
consider only the relevant dimension(s) of the target stimuli. For example, R 
and Fr principles were demonstrated with stimuli that varied in range and 
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skew with respect to the judged dimension. Neither the Range-Frequency 
Theory (Parducci, 1965, 1968, 1974) nor the Two-Path Theory (Manis and 
Paskewitz, 1984) that shares the R and Fr origin of contextual contrast can 
account for the effect reported in this research without assuming that judgment 
is sensitive to the context of irrelevant stimulus dimension. JUDGEMAP-1, in 
addition, relates the effect of irrelevant dimension with particular mechanisms, 
namely the spreading activation mechanism that can be responsible for the 
effect’s appearance. Although, these mechanisms are in their essence 
analogous to the once proposed by the Norm Theory (Kahneman and Miller, 
1986), the latter could not predict the direction of the judgment’s shift since it 
does not specifies how the target stimulus can be compared to the constructed 
norm.  
 
In general, the reported experiments demonstrated small but significant 
effect of irrelevant dimension on judgment. The effect was relatively stable 
across different experiments even though the experimental manipulations of 
several variables (R and Fr; correlated dimensions; stress) were expected to 
enlarge the size of the effect. The effect was smaller than the empirical 
maximum obtained by the two control experiments but comparable in to the 
effect of JUDGEMAP-1 simulation (Kokinov et al., 2004). 
Several possibilities seem relevant for explaining the small impact of 
the irrelevant information. First, it is possible that irrelevant information is 
considered but with lower weight than the relevant (the judged) one. People 
may pay less attention to the irrelevant to the task stimulus features and thus 
retrieve exemplars that are similar to the target stimulus along these irrelevant 
dimensions with smaller weight (probability). This explanation may shift the 
debate about the mechanisms responsible for the effect of the irrelevant 
dimension toward attention mechanisms, which, in principle, could be 
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considered as related to the perceptual learning mechanisms (Goldstone, 
1998). 
Second, it could be that the size of the effect depends on participants’ 
precision in judgment along the relevant dimension rather than the associative 
weights between judged stimuli and exemplars (or prototypes) stored in the 
LTM. Overall, participants in the reported experiments were quite precise in 
their judgments. Thus, if contextual effects in judgment are considered as 
“mistakes”, it seems reasonable to suppose that lower precision in judgment 
may ensure greater contextual effects.  Unfortunately, judgments’ precision 
was not varied in neither of the reported experiments. Even, experiment 5 was 
not designed to decrease judgment precision because participants judged ages 
with the same initial digit as belonging to the same scale category, e.g. 30 and 
35 were judged as 3, 40 and 45 – as 4. Thus, in order to obtain more 
information the issue concerning the dependence between judgement 
precision and the size of contextual effects should be pushed further.  
Third, it could be, however, that the effect of irrelevant dimension 
presented in this paper pushes the judgment opposite to contextually sensitive 
on-line categorization (i.e., assimilation toward perceptually similar objects 
and contrast from perceptually dissimilar objects) reported by Goldstone 
(1995). Suppose that participants judge positively skewed green lines and 
negatively skewed red lines. Then according to Goldstone’s observations, 
green lines should be judged lower than the red lines with the same length. 
This is exactly the opposite of the reported results. It could however be, that 
Goldstone’s effect “fights” against the effect of stimulus skew manipulated 
through the irrelevant dimension reported in this research. This may be one of 
the reasons for the small size of the contextual shift in judgments due to the 
irrelevant dimension. Moreover, the effect disappears in Experiment 3, where 
the stimuli were designed to be very dissimilar with respect to the irrelevant to 
the task information, i.e. the lines were presented always in the context of 
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particular meaningful sounds. Unfortunately, it seems extremely difficult to 
study the effect of the irrelevant dimension without activation of the 
perceptually grounded on-line categorization observed by Goldstone. 
 
Finally, the reported in this thesis series of experiments did not reveal a 
stable tendency in the behaviour of the effect of the irrelevant information 
depending on the number of trials. The interest in the behavior of the effect 
over time was provoked by the contra-hypothesis that context effects could be 
considered as a noise in the system. If this was the case, the effect of irrelevant 
dimension as well as any other contextual effect should decrease with time. 
Overall, the number of trials seems not to influence the effect of the irrelevant 
information in a systematic manner. Time enhanced the effect of the irrelevant 
dimension in Experiment 1, decreased the effect in Experiment 4, and did not 
affect substantially the contrast due to the irrelevant information in the rest of 
the experiments.  
 
In conclusion, experiments demonstrate systematic shift in judgment 
depending on an irrelevant to the task dimension of the stumuli. The impact  
of the irrelevant information was small and relatively stable across different 
experimental manipulations. Results were in line with JUDGEMAP-1’s 
prediction and hence support it. 
 
9.2.Contributions 
The experiments presented in this thesis demonstrate a stable in 
direction and size contrast effect in judgment due to the irrelevant dimension. 
In addition, the same effect was shown with both simple and complex/abstract 
stimuli, which may further challenge the traditional differentiation between 
judgment of simple (i.e., psychophysical) and judgment of complex (i.e., 
social) stimuli.  
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The experiments study the possibility for increasing the impact of the 
irrelevant dimension trough several experimental and theoretically motivated 
(with respect to JUDGEMAP-1) manipulations but failed to find any increase 
of the size of the effect. 
This research presents an attempt to explain the effect of the irrelevant 
dimension by particular mechanisms, namely the spreading activation 
mechanism used in the formation of the comparison set in WM. This 
explanation has been supported by the confirmation of JUDGEMAP’s 
predictions. 
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